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Financing Failure: Bankruptcy Lending, Credit
Market Conditions, and the Financial Crisis
Frederick Tung†
When contemplating Chapter 11, firms often need to seek financing for
their continuing operations in bankruptcy. Because such financing would
otherwise be hard to find, the Bankruptcy Code authorizes debtors to offer
sweeteners to debtor-in-possession (DIP) lenders. These inducements can be
effective in attracting financing, but because they are thought to come at the
expense of other stakeholders, the Code permits these inducements only if no
less generous a package would have been sufficient to obtain the loan.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the use of certain controversial
inducements—I focus on roll-ups and milestones—has skyrocketed in recent
years, leading critics to question whether DIP lenders were abusing their
power. Lenders, however, respond that DIP loan terms simply reflect economic
conditions: when credit is tight, as it was in recent years because of the
Financial Crisis, more sweeteners are needed to induce lending.
Using a hand-collected dataset reflecting contractual detail in DIP loan
agreements, I examine the relationship between changes in credit availability
and DIP loan terms before, during, and after the Crisis. As one might expect, I
find that ordinary loan provisions like pricing and reporting covenants are
sensitive to changes in credit availability. By contrast, I also find that the
incidence of so-called “extraordinary provisions” has no statistically
meaningful relationship with changes in credit availability. These findings have
important implications for bankruptcy policymakers and judges struggling to
evaluate whether extraordinary DIP lending inducements are necessary. Too
generous loan terms come at the expense of junior claimants and may distort
the bankruptcy process in favor of senior claimants.
†

Howard Zhang Faculty Research Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law
(fredtung@bu.edu). Many thanks for helpful comments from Ken Ayotte, Douglas Baird, Albert Choi,
Jared Ellias, Dirk Hackbarth, Colleen Honigsberg, Jonathan Landers, Rich Levin, Stephen Lubben,
Darius Palia, Mark Roe, George Triantis, and Kathy Zeiler, as well as workshop participants at the
American Law and Economics Association 2017 Annual Meeting, the American Law Institute 2017
Young Scholars Medal Conference, the University of Texas School of Law, the Villanova University
Business Law Colloquium, the Canadian Law and Economics Association 2016 Annual Meeting, the
UC Irvine School of Law, the University of Richmond School of Law, the Emroch Faculty Colloquy
Series, the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research 9th Emerging Markets Finance Conference
2018, and the University of Michigan Law School Legal Theory Workshop. Special thanks to Dante
Spurlock and Liqun Zhuge for excellent research assistance.

651

07. TUNG ARTICLE. DRAFT 3 MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

Yale Journal on Regulation

6/1/2020 6:23 AM

Vol. 37:651, 2020

Introduction ............................................................................................... 652
I. Background and Literature Review ....................................................... 656
A. The View from the Bench: Difficulty in Policing DIP Loan
Terms ........................................................................................ 656
B. The Lyondell DIP Loan ............................................................. 660
C. Loan Covenants and Credit Markets ......................................... 663
1. Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Covenants ............. 663
2. Credit Market Conditions ................................................... 665
II. Extraordinary Lending Inducements .................................................... 667
A. Roll-Ups .................................................................................... 668
1. Cross-Collateralization’s Ghost .......................................... 668
2. Roll-Up’s Refinement ......................................................... 669
B. Milestones ................................................................................. 672
C. Policy Responses to Extraordinary Provisions .......................... 672
III. Empirical Analysis ............................................................................. 674
A. Data and Sample ....................................................................... 674
1. Sample Selection................................................................. 674
2. Credit Availability .............................................................. 675
3. Descriptive Statistics........................................................... 676
B. DIP Loan Terms and the Financial Crisis: Ordinary
Provisions.................................................................................. 685
1. Pricing DIP Loans............................................................... 685
2. Loan Covenants .................................................................. 690
C. DIP Loan Terms and the Financial Crisis: Extraordinary
Provisions.................................................................................. 695
1. Incidence of Roll-Ups ......................................................... 695
2. Incidence of Milestones ...................................................... 702
IV. Implications and Conclusion .............................................................. 704
Appendix ................................................................................................... 707
Introduction
A firm that seeks refuge in Chapter 11 often requires financing for its
continuing operations in bankruptcy. Its pre-bankruptcy sources of credit
typically dry up, and it often cannot proceed without what is known as debtorin-possession (“DIP”) financing. The terms of the DIP financing matter a great
deal for the bankruptcy case and its participants. DIP loans are approved early
on in the Chapter 11 case, often in a rush. Specific loan terms and the identity
of the DIP lender have an enormous impact on the ensuing contestation of the
terms of reorganization, which shape the contours of any surviving business
and distributions to creditors.
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To induce DIP lending, the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the debtor to
provide prospective lenders with sweeteners that make DIP financing
attractive. But because these inducements may come at the expense of other
stakeholders, the Code requires the debtor to convince the court that no less
generous a package would have been sufficient to obtain the loan. The Code
expressly authorizes such conventional inducements as first-priority liens and
payment priority when liens may be insufficient. These inducements make
sense: lenders to distressed borrowers typically demand strong assurances with
respect to the new money they bring to the table.
Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that DIP loans have become
littered with certain controversial lending inducements in recent years. Some
have begun to question whether these sweeteners are truly necessary to induce
lending, suggesting instead that DIP lenders now extract excessively generous
terms.1 In response, DIP lenders and their defenders note a simple explanation
for this seeming increase in inducements: reduced credit availability during the
Financial Crisis.2 When credit is tight, of course lenders need more
sweeteners—which is why judges have explicitly relied on changing credit
market conditions to justify their approval of so-called “extraordinary” lending
inducements.3
In this Article, I examine whether changes in credit availability explain
the use of extraordinary inducements in DIP loans. Using a hand-collected
dataset including detailed information on DIP loan terms from 2004 to 2012, I
provide the first evidence on the relationship between the presence of these
terms and changing credit availability. I first show that standard terms, like
loan pricing and reporting covenants,4 are indeed sensitive to economic
conditions. I then offer evidence that the extraordinary inducements found in
DIP loans are generally unrelated to the broader economic conditions that have
been cited to justify judicial approval.

1.
COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, AM. BANKR. INST., 2012-2014 FINAL
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 73-79 (2014) [hereinafter ABI REPORT] (discussing findings from a
study on DIP financing and detailing the Commission’s recommendations, which include limitations on
creditor inducements for entering into DIP financing agreements).
2. See, e.g., Robert H. Barnett & Brian J. Grant, Credit Crisis Puts Focus on Out-of-Court
Restructurings, J. CORP. RENEWAL, June 2010, at 4.
3.
David Griffiths, Roll-Up, Roll-Up, Read All About It!, WEIL BANKR. (Oct. 6, 2010),
https://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/dip-financing/roll-up-roll-up-read-all-about-it
[https://perma.cc/SP86-34P] (noting bankruptcy judges’ explicit consideration of market conditions
when granting substantial inducements to DIP financers).
4.
Reporting covenants govern the frequency with which the debtor must report specified
financial information or events to the lender. A reporting covenant may, for example, require the
borrower’s monthly reporting of its cash flows. E.g., Debtor-in-Possession Credit Agreement 77 (Jan.
20, 2012) in Eastman Kodak, Annual Report Exhibit 4.22 (Form 10-K) (Feb. 29, 2012) (requiring the
borrower to report cash flows within fifteen days of the end of each fiscal month).
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I focus on two extraordinary lending inducements that judges and lawyers
often find troubling: “roll-ups” and case milestones.5 DIP financing is most
commonly provided by the debtor’s major pre-bankruptcy secured lender. A
roll-up allows this DIP lender to reduce its financial risk by requiring the
debtor to draw on the DIP loan to pay off some—typically all—of the DIP
lender’s pre-bankruptcy secured claim against the debtor. This gives the DIP
lender a peace of mind rarely enjoyed by other creditors in bankruptcy.
Creditors’ pre-bankruptcy claims ordinarily get paid only at the end of the case,
after the debtor—and perhaps competing creditors—have had some
opportunity to investigate and possibly challenge those claims. 6 Absent some
opportunity to investigate, roll-ups may reduce the debtor’s negotiating
leverage with the DIP lender going forward.7 Roll-ups also eliminate other
avenues of negotiation that might otherwise be open to the debtor.8 Case
milestones are covenants that set specific deadlines for important events in the
case, giving lenders critical control over the reorganization process and curbing
the discretion of the debtor’s management and the bankruptcy court. For
example, a common milestone sets a drop-dead date for the filing or court
approval of the reorganization plan.9 Milestones are controversial because too
tight deadlines may advantage senior creditors—like DIP lenders—at the
expense of junior creditors.10 Neither roll-ups nor case milestones are
specifically authorized in the Bankruptcy Code. They may even contradict
specific provisions of the Code.11
As an empirical matter, because debtor firms are not randomly assigned to
DIP loans, selection and endogeneity concerns preclude any causal
conclusions, and my empirical goals are modest. I investigate a cross-section of
Chapter 11 debtors with DIP loans, examining both ordinary and extraordinary
provisions in those loans. I search for any evidence suggesting a negative
association between changes in credit availability and the use of extraordinary

5. See, e.g., ABI REPORT, supra note 1, at 76-79 (discussing the Commission’s findings and
noting concerns regarding roll-ups and case milestones).
6.
Moreover, unsecured creditors’ claims are typically paid with promises of future payment
that do not make them whole. Outside of the roll-up context, significant pre-bankruptcy claims rarely
get paid in full in cash in the early part of the case. Also, the new DIP debt, including the roll-up (that is,
the amount incurred to repay the DIP lender’s pre-bankruptcy claim against the debtor) enjoys an
especially high priority in payment in reorganization. DIP debt must be paid in full in cash as a
condition to plan confirmation. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A) (2018).
7. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
8. See id.
9.
A less common milestone sets a deadline for court approval or completion of a specified
sale of debtor assets. See infra Section II.B.
10.
For example, a quick sale of debtor assets may generate sale proceeds sufficient only to
pay off a senior creditor, while a longer marketing period might have helped realize a higher sale price.
See Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV 1, 26 (2007)
(concluding a debtor will receive a lower price if the sale is made earlier in the bankruptcy process).
11. See General Order No. M-274, U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York, In re Adoption of Guidelines for Fin. Requests (Sept. 9, 2002) [hereinafter SDNY General Order].
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provisions. We would expect the use of extraordinary inducements to decrease
with increasing credit availability (and increase with credit tightening). Indeed,
we see this result with the “ordinary” provisions that I examine (i.e., pricing
and loan covenants). However, despite the use of multiple empirical measures
for changes in credit availability and extraordinary provisions, I fail to find
evidence of the expected negative association. Moreover, my tests in some
instances suggest that extraordinary inducements are positively associated with
changes in credit availability. The causal claims made to justify resort to
extraordinary provisions do not survive careful scrutiny. Given the absence of
any association between the use of extraordinary provisions and changes in
credit availability, extraordinary provisions seem difficult to justify.
My paper has significant policy implications for bankruptcy participants.
The market for DIP financing has grown steadily in size and significance in the
last two decades as the size of public company bankruptcies has increased.
Individual judges deciding whether to approve a particular set of DIP loan
terms often face a difficult decision. They must assess whether the
extraordinary terms are necessary to induce lending, but they do not have the
benefit of counterfactuals. Judges worry that rejection of the proposed DIP loan
would spell doom for the debtor: without financing, liquidation may be the
only alternative. A number of institutional features make the judge’s decision
doubly difficult. The debtor’s dominant pre-bankruptcy secured lender (the
“inside” lender) enjoys a number of advantages over outside lenders in
competing to make the DIP loan.12 This inside lender also typically has strong
incentives to make the DIP loan, which it does in the supermajority of cases. 13
Providing DIP financing enables the senior secured lender to exercise
significant control over the case.14 With typically only one offer on the table
and no competitors in sight, judges quite understandably hesitate to reject the
DIP loan negotiated between the debtor and the inside lender. Instead, the
judge reluctantly approves the proffered arrangements on the view that the
terms were necessary to induce critical lending.
Given the lack of a well-functioning DIP loan market and the dominant
role for inside lenders in providing DIP financing, it should hardly be
12. See infra Section I.A. (detailing the relationship between the inside lender and the
borrower in the bankruptcy process).
13.
Inside lenders made 75% of the DIP loans in my sample. See infra Section I.A.
14.
Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11,
1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 512 (2009) (“[C]reditors with senior, secured claims have come to dominate
the Chapter 11 process.”); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing
Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1236 (2006) (“Senior creditors keep their
hands on the levers of corporate governance even after the corporation enters Chapter 11.”); David A.
Skeel, Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1905,
1918-19 (2004) (noting the process through which creditors control Chapter 11 cases); Sreedhar T.
Bharath et al., The Changing Nature of Chapter 11, at 6 (IIM Bangalore, Research Paper No. 461,
2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2443248 [https://perma.cc/NU3X-BQL3] (“Financial innovations (such
as DIP and KERP), ha[ve] contributed to an increase in creditor control of the Chapter 11
process . . . .”).
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surprising that some important DIP loan terms may be less than responsive to
market pressures, bearing little or no relation to changes in credit availability.
Recognizing the potentially problematic nature of extraordinary provisions, the
American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI) offered guidelines in recent Chapter 11
reform proposals to curb or delay the effects of extraordinary DIP loan
provisions.15 I provide, to my knowledge, the first empirical evidence
questioning the longstanding and widely held assumption that extraordinary
provisions are a function of changing credit availability. This analysis will
hopefully assist policymakers, judges, and other bankruptcy participants to
better evaluate the DIP lending process in order to optimize DIP loan structure
going forward. In particular, because roll-ups—and to a lesser extent,
milestones—run counter to bankruptcy rules and norms, judges should be
skeptical about their use, which should be rare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Part I offers conceptual and
institutional background along with a review of the relevant literature. It first
explains the tricky institutional context within which judges must decide
whether to approve a given DIP loan. It then discusses the role of loan
covenants and the effects on loan covenants of changing credit market
conditions. Part II describes extraordinary provisions, their perceived harms,
and policy responses. Part III describes the data and empirical results. Part IV
discusses implications of my findings and then concludes.
I. Background and Literature Review
In this Part, I first explain the institutional context in which DIP lending
occurs, a setting that makes it difficult for judges to police DIP loan terms. I
follow with a description of the Lyondell DIP loan and the process by which it
was put together. At the time, it was the second-largest commercial DIP loan in
history, made in the face of increasingly severe credit scarcity. Finally, as
prelude to the ensuing analysis of ordinary as well as extraordinary DIP loan
provisions, I elaborate on the role of loan covenants and the effects on loan
covenants of changing credit market conditions.
A. The View from the Bench: Difficulty in Policing DIP Loan Terms
In a traditional Chapter 11 reorganization, the debtor and its multiple
creditors negotiate over the financial (and sometimes operational) restructuring
of the firm. The debtor firm, its major secured and unsecured creditors, and an
official committee representing unsecured creditors typically drive the process.
The general goal is to reduce the debt burden on the company such that its
operations can generate sufficient cash flow to service the remaining debt.
15.
ABI REPORT, supra note 1, at 73-74 (recommending principles to guide DIP financing
inducements).
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Creditors may agree to reduce their pre-bankruptcy claims against the debtor,
extend maturities, reduce interest rates, or otherwise ease the debtor’s debt
burdens. Eventually a plan of reorganization memorializes this multiparty
bargain. The plan requires both creditor consent and judicial approval.16 The
bankruptcy court confirms the plan after ensuring all confirmation
requirements have been met.17 While the debtor typically drafts the plan,18 the
debtor’s major pre-bankruptcy secured lenders generally enjoy outsized
influence in reorganization. By the time a firm is facing a Chapter 11 filing,
substantially all of its assets are typically subject to creditor liens.19 A DIP loan
enables the debtor’s dominant pre-bankruptcy lenders to augment their control
of the case.20
Evaluating whether a DIP loan’s terms are the best available for the
debtor is no small task for a judge. Institutional features of DIP lending give an
edge to the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy secured lender in capturing the DIP loan.
Therefore, in the vast majority of cases, there may be no real competition to
offer DIP financing. No true market exists for DIP loans. Instead, the debtor’s
dominant pre-bankruptcy secured lender (the “inside” lender) essentially enjoys
a first option to fund the DIP loan.
The inside lender typically has enormous incentive to make the DIP loan
because it has its existing pre-bankruptcy loan to protect. Making this
“defensive” DIP loan preserves the inside lender’s control over the debtor’s
assets,21 and it enables the lender to advantage its pre-bankruptcy claim as part
of the deal.22 It also endows the inside lender with enormous influence over the

16.
11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2018) (“The court shall confirm a plan only if . . . each holder of a
claim or interest of such class—has accepted the plan . . . .”).
17. See id.
18.
In large public company bankruptcies, the debtor typically enjoys the exclusive right to
file a plan with the court for the first eighteen months of the case. Id. § 1121(d)(1). This “exclusivity”
therefore gives the debtor some measure of agenda control.
19. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
20. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
21.
The DIP loan would typically be secured by first-priority liens on all the debtor’s assets,
including its cash, and the lender’s pre-bankruptcy claim would enjoy next priority with respect to the
debtor’s assets. In this way, the inside lender would control both loans and would enjoy first claim to the
debtor’s assets to satisfy its debts.
22.
For example, the DIP loan agreement typically requires the debtor to acknowledge the
validity of the lender’s pre-bankruptcy claim and liens, to recognize its fully secured status, and to waive
any potential challenges. E.g., Final Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sections 105, 361, 362, 363 and 364
and Rules 2002, 4001 and 9014 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (1) Authorizing
Incurrence by the Debtors of Post-Petition Secured Indebtedness with Priority over Certain Secured
Indebtedness and with Administrative Superpriority, (2) Granting Liens, (3) Authorizing Use of Cash
Collateral by the Debtors Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 363 and Providing for Adequate Protection, and
(4) Modifying the Automatic Stay at 7-12, In re Eddie Bauer, Inc., No. 09-12099 (Bankr. D. Del. July 8,
2009) (detailing the validity of the lender’s prepetition lien). That agreement, of course, would not bind
the creditors’ committee.
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debtor and the bankruptcy proceedings.23 Bankruptcy scholars identify DIP
financing as one important avenue by which secured creditors have gained
influence over the reorganization process.24
In addition to this incentive structure, the pre-bankruptcy lender also
enjoys a significant informational advantage over competing outside lenders
because of its pre-bankruptcy relationship with the debtor. This up-to-date
private information may enable the inside lender to underbid prospective
outside lenders, as well as deter competition ex ante. Prospective outside
lenders would have to expend resources on due diligence in order to be able to
offer competitive terms. Once invested, they face the prospect of either getting
outbid by the inside lender—in which case the outside lender’s investment in
due diligence is for naught—or potentially overbidding to get the DIP loan.
Given the inside lender’s information advantage, as well as its incentive to
make the DIP loan in order to protect its existing pre-bankruptcy loan, outside
lenders seldom initiate a challenge.
A pre-bankruptcy lender also typically has pre-bankruptcy liens on all the
debtor’s assets by the time bankruptcy approaches, so the debtor may have no
free assets to offer an outside lender as collateral.25 The pre-bankruptcy lender,
then, may be the only game in town—the only lender willing and able to
finance the bankruptcy. Consistent with the information and incentive
structures, inside lenders made 75% of the DIP loans in my sample, and these
inside lenders enjoy pre-bankruptcy liens on all of the debtor’s assets in 81% of
the cases. In any case, whether inside or outside lenders make the DIP loan, the
DIP loan is typically fully secured with first-priority liens on substantially all
the debtor’s assets.

23.
The means of influence include budget constraints and constraints on the debtor’s use of
its DIP loan proceeds and other cash. See infra Section III.A.3 (detailing the most common covenant
constraints used by DIP lenders).
24. See, e.g., Bharath et al., supra note 14. They study deviations from absolute priority—
reorganization plans in which senior creditors waive their right to full payment of their claims in order
to allow junior claimants to receive some consideration. These deviations reflect incumbent
management’s hold-up power over creditors and therefore weak creditor influence. The authors
document a secular decline in the incidence of absolute-priority violations from the 1980s to 2005, as
well as a corresponding increase in the use of DIP financing. They find a negative association between
the presence of DIP financing and absolute-priority deviations. See also supra note 14 (listing additional
relevant sources).
25.
An outside lender would almost certainly insist on first-priority liens to secure its new DIP
loan, but the court may not authorize such priming liens unless the debtor can offer the pre-bankruptcy
lender “adequate protection.” 11 U.S.C. § 364(d) (1)(B) (2018) (stating that a court “may authorize the
obtaining of credit or the incurring of debt . . . only if . . . there is adequate protection of the” senior
lender). In order to be able to offer priming liens to the outside DIP lender, the debtor must be able to
preserve the pre-bankruptcy lender’s secured position—for example, by granting additional liens or
making cash payments to reduce the pre-bankruptcy lender’s claim—such that the pre-bankruptcy
lender is not prejudiced by having its liens subordinated to the priming DIP lender’s new liens. The
debtor in this situation is unlikely to be able to offer adequate protection. Moreover, fights over the
adequacy of adequate protection in the context of priming liens are contentious and expensive.
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Besides the typically weak competition for any given DIP loan, a rushed
approval process at the outset of the case makes it difficult for the bankruptcy
court or junior claimants to challenge the debtor’s generosity in its offering of
lending inducements. An interim approval of a portion of the proposed DIP
loan is typically made early in the case (the motion is typically filed on the
same day as the debtor’s bankruptcy petition).26 The debtor and its lawyers
claim that the debtor’s cash needs are dire, so that a hearing is held only days
after the bankruptcy filing, on expedited notice. Given the hectic early days of
any large Chapter 11 proceeding, approving a DIP loan is only one of dozens
of issues the bankruptcy court must decide at the outset. So interim DIP loan
approval is done in a hurry.27 Though the subsequent hearing on the final DIP
order may be more considered, the interim approval creates a certain
momentum favoring the status quo.28 The final order might possibly modify
some terms, but the possibility of an alternative lender is basically foreclosed.
A final difficulty for judges is the simple fact that obtaining DIP financing
is good news for the debtor and its creditors. The parties may disagree on the
details, but they agree that the debtor needs the financing! The finance
literature by and large finds beneficent case outcomes associated with the
presence of DIP lending.29 Both stocks and bonds of public companies

26. See 2 JOAN N. FEENEY ET AL., BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL §§ 11:16, 11:19 (5th ed.
2019-2).
27.
It is for this reason that important bankruptcy courts and the ABI discourage interim
approval of extraordinary provisions like roll-ups and milestones. See, e.g., ABI REPORT, supra note 1,
at 80 (“A court should not approve permissible extraordinary financing provisions in connection with
any proposed postpetition financing under section 364 in any interim order.”).
28.
The advance of DIP loan proceeds authorized in the interim order is subject only to the
terms of the earlier order; subsequent modification in the court’s final order does not change the terms
of the earlier advance. 11 U.S.C. § 364(e) (2018) (“The reversal or modification on appeal of an
authorization . . . does not affect the validity of the debt so incurred, or any priority or lien so
granted . . . .”). This makes some sense, since no lender would advance funds under terms that might
later be changed. At the same time, however, once funds have been lent, the interim order may tend to
“anchor” the deal terms in the face of subsequent objections.
29.
This is consistent with findings outside the bankruptcy context that obtaining a bank loan
is typically good news for a firm. Ronald Best & Hang Zhang, Alternative Information Sources and the
Information Content of Bank Loans, 48 J. FIN. 1507, 1511 (1993); Matthew T. Billett et al., The Effect of
Lender Identity on a Borrowing Firm’s Equity Return, 50 J. FIN. 699, 700 (1995); Christopher James,
Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 217, 219 (1987); Scott L. Lummer &
John J. McConnell, Further Evidence on the Bank Lending Process and the Capital-Market Response to
Bank Loan Agreements, J. FIN. ECON. 99, 101 (1989); Myron B. Slovin et al., Firm Size and the
Information Content of Bank Loan Announcements, 16 J. BANKING & FIN. 1057, 1058 (1992). Although
I hesitate to infer that DIP loans cause these positive outcomes, I note a few possible explanations that
are not mutually exclusive. First, bank monitoring may add value by improving managerial performance
during the reorganization, such that emergence becomes more likely. Bankers are repeat players in
distress situations and may take actions that improve the likelihood of emergence, such as mandating
that the debtor’s management hire a chief restructuring officer. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 14,
at 1233 (“[B]anks may condition the waiver of loan covenants on the appointment of a CRO [Chief
Restructuring Officer].”). Second, prospective DIP lenders may be effective screeners of good credit
risks, such that the import of DIP lending is in the selection. Both these explanations—monitoring and
selection—have antecedents in the finance literature on banks generally. See, e.g., Amar Gande &
Anthony Saunders, Are Banks Still Special When There Is a Secondary Market for Loans?, 67 J. FIN.
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typically enjoy significant abnormal returns when the company announces a
DIP loan, suggesting that DIP loans provide widely shared benefits for both
junior and senior claimants.30 DIP lending is also associated with a higher
likelihood of the debtor’s emergence from bankruptcy and a shorter time in
bankruptcy.31 These effects are greater when the DIP lender is also the debtor’s
pre-bankruptcy lender, suggesting strong screening and monitoring roles for
relational DIP lenders, who use their private information about debtor firms to
select for strong borrowers and then help them emerge quickly.32 Researchers
also find a positive association between DIP loan size and creditor recovery
rates, consistent with efficient lender monitoring.33 A judge caught between
approving a DIP order with questionable inducements or denying the debtor’s
financing might understandably err on the side of caution and approve the loan.
Institutional factors, then, make it difficult for judges to deny DIP loans,
even if they may view certain terms as value-reducing. These features of DIP
financing may create tough hurdles for opponents of aggressive lender
protections, especially when credit is tight.
B. The Lyondell DIP Loan
The Lyondell case offers a useful illustration of the dynamics of DIP loan
structure during a time of severe credit scarcity. Lyondell Chemical Co., a
Houston-based chemical company, filed for Chapter 11 on January 6, 2009, 34
during the depths of the Financial Crisis. Aggressive lending inducements for
Lyondell’s DIP loan included steep pricing, strict covenants, perhaps the
largest roll-up in history, and draconian milestones. Judge Gerber’s reluctant
approval of Lyondell’s hotly contested $8.5 billion DIP loan well illustrates
judges’ predicament. Judge Gerber noted at the time:
1649 (2012). Finally, it is of course possible that the additional funding assists the reorganization
process, increasing the likelihood of emergence.
30. See Sris Chaterjee et al., Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 3097
(2004).
31.
Sandeep Dahiya et al., Debtor-in-Possession Financing and Bankruptcy Resolution:
Empirical Evidence, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 259, 278 (2003) (“We find that DIP financing is associated with a
higher probability of emergence as well as a shorter time in bankruptcy (both for firms that reorganize
and for firms that liquidate.”).
32. Id.
33.
Chaterjee et al., supra note 30, at 3099; Dahiya et al., supra note 31; Maria Carapeto, Does
Debtor-in-Possession
Financing
Add
Value?
(Oct.
6,
2003),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.197.6324&rep=rep1&type=pdf
[https://perma.cc/2EUY-KSVJ].
34.
This initial filing included all of Lyondell’s U.S. affiliates. Other affiliates followed
Lyondell into bankruptcy in April and May of 2009. All told, ninety-four Lyondell affiliates ultimately
filed for bankruptcy. All ninety-four cases were jointly administered by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District of New York. Third Amended Disclosure Statement Accompanying Third
Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization for the LyondellBasell Debtors at 42, In re Lyondell
Chem. Co., No. 09-10023 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2010) [hereinafter Lyondell Disclosure Statement]
(“All 94 of these Chapter 11 Cases are jointly administered in the Bankruptcy Court.”).
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I assume, or at least hope that economic conditions in this country, including
freeze-ups of the lending markets and the very limited present availability of
credit will ultimately improve. What I’m of a mind to recognize and respect now
in the way of economic reality will be trumped by the facts on the ground with
respect to economic conditions at the time of the next financing I’m asked to
approve. And people should be wary of using this case as a precedent in the next
one that comes down the road, especially if that’s the case after the liquidity
markets have loosened up.35

About a year earlier, when Lyondell was the third-largest independent publicly
traded chemical company in North America,36 it had sold itself via a leveraged
buyout to Basell AF S.C.A., a Dutch subsidiary of an even larger European
industrial conglomerate. The transaction created the LyondellBasell group of
companies, one of the world’s largest petrochemical firms, with a post-LBO
debt burden approaching $30 billion.37 Shortly after this transaction, steeply
rising oil prices, a global recession, and a rough 2008 hurricane season for the
Gulf Coast combined to preclude Lyondell from meeting its debt obligations,
forcing it into bankruptcy.38
On the day of its bankruptcy filing, Lyondell moved for an order
authorizing an $8.5 billion DIP loan, at the time, the second-largest commercial
DIP loan ever.39 With global credit markets extremely tight, Lyondell’s
proposed DIP loan included a number of important twists to induce lending.
Most importantly, the requested DIP facility included a $6.5 billion term loan, 40
35.
Griffiths, supra note 3 (quoting Judge Gerber’s statement in Lyondell).
36.
Lyondell Disclosure Statement, supra note 34, at 25.
37. Lyondell Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 6. 2009, 5:51 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/01/06/lyondellbasell-us-unit-files-for-bankruptcy
[https://perma.cc/H69M-7DGG].
38.
Lyondell Disclosure Statement, supra note 34, at 39 (noting volatile commodity prices, the
global recession, and natural disasters as contributing factors to the company’s bankruptcy filing).
39.
Among other things, the motion asked for an interim order approving an immediate $2
billion draw to tide the debtors over until a final hearing could be held. Over the following two days,
hearings were held, and on the second day, the judge approved the interim $2 billion draw. Interim
Order (I) Authorizing Debtors (A) to Obtain Post-Petition Financing Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 361,
362, 364(c)(1), 364(c)(2), 364(c)(3), 364(d)(1) and 364(e), (B) to Utilize Cash Collateral Pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 363 and (C) to Purchase Certain Assets Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363, (II) Granting Adequate
Protection to Pre-Petition Secured Parties Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362, 363 and 364 and (III)
Scheduling Final Hearing Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 4001(b) and (c) at 10, Lyondell (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2009) (granting interim financing). The debtors were also given immediate access to a
$1.5 billion asset-based lending (“ABL”) DIP facility, a revolving facility collateralized by the debtors’
inventory and accounts receivable. Id. at 19.
40.
The other $2 billion was in the form of a revolving credit facility. Final Order (I)
Authorizing Debtors (A) to Obtain Post-Petition Financing Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 361, 362,
364(c)(1), 364(c)(2), 364(c)(3), 364(d)(1) and 364(e), (B) to Utilize Cash Collateral Pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 363 and (c) to Purchase Certain Assets Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363, and (II) Granting
Adequate Protection to Pre-Petition Secured Parties Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362, 363 and 364 at
2, Lyondell (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Lyondell Final DIP Order] (noting a $2 billion
option increase in DIP credit agreement).
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consisting of $3.25 billion of “new money”—actual new credit for the
debtors—and a $3.25 billion roll-up. The roll-up debt refinanced $3.25 billion
of the DIP lenders’ pre-bankruptcy secured debt, essentially doubling the
interest costs of the term loan.41 The DIP loan also conferred hefty fees to the
DIP lenders.
The DIP loan imposed several tight deadlines on the debtor. The DIP
loan’s original maturity date was set at December 15, 2009, less than a year
from the date of Lyondell’s bankruptcy filing. And the DIP loan agreement set
draconian milestones for a case as large and complicated as Lyondell. For
example, the debtors were given only seven months to deliver a draft plan of
reorganization and disclosure statement to the DIP lenders.42
The hearing on the final order approving the DIP loan was hotly
contested, lasting three days.43 Lyondell’s creditors’ committee objected to the
tight maturity date and milestones, as well as what it saw as unreasonably tight
financial covenants. As the Committee also noted, pricing was steep: a 13%
interest rate and about 7% in fees for what was initially a less-than-one-year
loan. Under the original maturity, the arrangement would have given the DIP
lenders a 20% annual return!44
41.
Had the $3.25 billion term roll-up not been rolled up, its status as a $3.25 billion prebankruptcy debt would have garnered it interest during the course of the case only to the extent it was
oversecured, 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2018), and also at a lower rate than the DIP debt. While rolled-up debt
would generally also enjoy a near-certainty of repayment, since all DIP debt has to be repaid in cash at
plan confirmation, id. § 1129(a)(9)(A), Lyondell’s DIP loan included an option for the debtors to
refinance their roll-up debt with a five-year debt security. Lyondell Final DIP Order, supra note 40, at
63. This was a “dollar-for-dollar” roll-up. Only prepetition secured lenders willing to participate in the
DIP financing were entitled to roll up their pre-bankruptcy debt, and then only on a dollar-for-dollar
basis (i.e., one dollar of new DIP financing entitled the DIP lender to roll up one dollar of prebankruptcy debt). Although this aggressive inducement resulted in unequal treatment among prepetition
secured lenders’ claims, the judge was willing to approve the dollar-for-dollar feature due to Lyondell’s
dire circumstances. See id. at 20; Griffiths, supra note 3 (noting Judge Gerber’s express consideration of
economic conditions in granting DIP financing).
42.
The debtors were also given:
(i)
an additional month (until September 15, 2009) to file the plan and disclosure statement
with the bankruptcy court;
(ii)
a month after that (until October 15, 2009) to obtain bankruptcy court approval of the
disclosure statement; and
(iii)
a month and a half after that (until December 1, 2009) to have the bankruptcy court hold
a hearing to confirm the plan.
Debtor-in-Possession Credit Agreement Among LyondellBasell Industries AF S.C.A. et al. 97 (Mar. 3,
2009).
43.
Griffiths, supra note 3.
44.
Objection of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to Motion for an Order
(I) Authorizing Debtors (A) to Obtain DIP Facility Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 361, 362, 364(c)(1),
364(c)(2), 364(c)(3), 364(d)(1) and 364(e), (B) to Utilize Cash Collateral Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363
and (c) to Purchase Certain Assets Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363, (II) Granting Adequate Protection to
Pre-Petition Secured Parties Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362, 363 and 364 and (III) Scheduling a
Final Hearing Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 4001(b) and (c) at 23-24, Lyondell (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb.
22, 2009) (“The Debtors have committed to borrow money at 20% to pay interest on the Roll Up which
would otherwise accrue at less than 7%.”). The Committee also objected to the proposed granting of
liens to the DIP lenders in the debtors’ avoidance actions, id. at 27, as well as the proposed waiver of the
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Though Judge Gerber shared many of the Committee’s concerns, he
approved the $8.5 billion DIP loan nonetheless, recognizing the dramatic
shrinking of credit markets and that the debtors’ assets would be liquidated if
no financing were found. As earlier noted, however, he did take pains to try to
limit the precedential value of his decision.45
The DIP loan agreement was amended several times over the course of
the case to extend the loan’s maturity and applicable milestones,46 and
Lyondell’s plan was ultimately confirmed. Lyondell emerged from bankruptcy
on April 30, 2010, having spent about sixteen months in Chapter 11.47
C. Loan Covenants and Credit Markets
Because lenders know less about prospective borrowers than the
borrowers know about themselves, lenders need devices to (a) screen for risky
borrowers before deciding whether to lend and on what terms; and (b) constrain
borrower risk-taking once a loan is made. Covenants are the most visible
contractual constraint on borrower risk-taking. This section explains lenders’
use of covenants and the effects of credit market changes on loan pricing and
covenant design.
1. Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Covenants
The typical bank loan agreement specifies a number of financial
covenants—continuing obligations relating to the borrower’s financial
condition that serve as tripwires should the borrower falter. For example, a
common financial covenant requires the borrower to maintain a minimum level
of cash flow.48 Such a requirement benefits banks by assuring them that the

debtors’ rights under § 506(c) to surcharge the collateral, id. at 29. Section 506(c) authorizes the debtor
to charge a secured creditor’s collateral for reasonable expenses incurred to preserve or dispose of that
collateral to the extent the secured creditor benefits. The debtor’s waiver of section 506(c) rights forces
unsecured creditors to bear the costs of preserving the DIP lender’s collateral. The Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District of New York lists § 506(c) waivers among its extraordinary provisions. See SDNY
General Order, supra note 11, at 10 (“Extraordinary Provisions include any waiver of the debtor’s right
to a surcharge against collateral under section 506(c) . . . .”).
45. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
46.
Lyondell Disclosure Statement, supra note 34, at 47.
47.
The new money DIP loan claims were repaid in full. The DIP roll-up claims were
refinanced with new notes in the same principal amount as their roll-ups, which the debtors anticipated
would amount to 100% recoveries. The prepetition secured claims received the lion’s share of the
common stock in the reorganized Lyondell. General unsecured creditors received a 16.8% recovery in
the form of cash and common stock, plus the possibility of additional payments based on causes of
action of the debtor to be pursued by a special Litigation Trust post-reorganization. Id. at 9.
48.
A cash flow covenant may state a minimum dollar requirement over a specified period. Or
it may take the form of a coverage ratio, which requires the borrower to maintain its cash flow at or
above a certain multiple of its interest expense. One study of public-company loan agreements finds that
83% contain some form of cash flow covenant. Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, Renegotiation of
Financial Contracts: Evidence from Private Credit Agreements, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 159, 172 (2009).
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borrower will be able to meet its loan obligations: steady cash flow evidences
the borrower’s ability to make its regular interest payments. Similarly, the loan
agreement may require regular reporting of the borrower’s cash levels. A
lending agreement may also require or prohibit certain activities that could
affect the riskiness of the loan. For example, a cap on capital expenditures or
other investments is common,49 as is a requirement that the borrower maintain
adequate insurance.
Lenders use covenants to constrain borrower moral hazard once the loan
is made. Without these constraints, borrowers may be tempted to take on more
risk after the loan is made than they let on beforehand.50 The borrower’s
violation of a covenant is considered an event of default. Upon default, the
lender is entitled to call the loan and seize and sell the debtor’s assets to satisfy
the debt. Covenants essentially determine control rights over the borrower’s
assets.51 This risk of loss serves as an important deterrent to excessive risk
taking.
Besides constraining borrower risk-taking ex post, covenants also help
lenders screen their borrowers ex ante.52 A borrower willing to accept strict
covenants effectively signals its creditworthiness to the lender and its
willingness to narrow its risk-shifting opportunities. Not surprisingly, tighter
covenants are associated with lower borrowing costs,53 since tight covenants
offer the lender more sensitive trip wires and stronger constraints on borrower

49.
To deter overly aggressive investments by the borrower, capital-expenditures covenants
place either a strict dollar limit on annual capital expenditures or set a cap based on the borrower’s
earnings or revenues. Greg Nini et al., Creditor Control Rights and Firm Investment Policy, 92 J. FIN.
ECON. 400, 405 (2009) (finding that 42% of firms in their 1996-2005 sample period faced a capital
expenditure covenant). To further deter overly aggressive investment, capital-expenditures covenants
are often paired with covenants that subject the loan’s proceeds to explicit restrictions. For example, the
loan contract may mandate loan prepayments to the extent the borrower finds itself with “excess” cash,
as defined in the contract. Id. Michael Bradley and Michael Roberts note in a sample of bank loan
agreements to public and private companies that 62.5% contain an asset sale sweep covenant—requiring
loan prepayment from the proceeds of certain asset sales; 46.2% contain a debt sweep—requiring
prepayment from proceeds of debt offerings; and 45.9% contain an equity sweep—which requires
prepayment from proceeds of an equity offering. Michael Bradley & Michael R. Roberts, The Structure
and Pricing of Corporate Debt Covenants 11 (Mar. 11, 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=466240
[https://perma.cc/3Z98-GD3J].
50.
A borrower with limited liability may be tempted to take excessive risk in search of higher
returns, despite the accompanying possibility of larger losses, since its losses are limited to the value of
its assets.
51.
Collateral plays a similar role. By granting security interests in its property to the lender,
the borrower essentially offers the lender a semiprivate enforcement remedy should the borrower
default. This enables the lender to sell the collateral with relatively little oversight by a court or other
public regulator. Colleen Honigsberg et al., State Contract Law and Debt Contracts, 57 J.L. & ECON.
1031 (2014). I do not focus on collateral, however, because there is little variation in collateral coverage
across the sample firms.
52. See Cem Demiroglu & Christopher James, The Information Content of Bank Loan
Covenants, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 3700, 3701 (2010); Nicolae Garleanu & Jeffrey Zwiebel, Design and
Renegotiation of Debt Covenants, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 749 (2009).
53.
Demiroglu & James, supra note 52, at 3701.

664

07. TUNG ARTICLE. DRAFT 3 MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

6/1/2020 6:23 AM

Financing Failure
risk taking. This better pricing is consistent with the notion that borrowers’
accession to stricter constraints signals lower risk to lenders.
The lender will monitor the borrower to ensure that it adheres to its
contractual constraints. Covenants encourage monitoring, and they are more
valuable to lenders who monitor well.54 Contracts provide lenders with
multiple mechanisms to facilitate such monitoring. First, the borrower will
generally be required to provide regular reports on its financial condition and
operating obligations. Second, the borrower will be required to notify the
lender should specific negative events occur.55 Third, the contract will provide
the lender with wide access to the borrower’s books and records, properties,
and management. The loan agreement may even require the borrower to keep
its deposit accounts with the lender bank. This arrangement facilitates the
bank’s real-time monitoring of the borrower’s cash flows, giving the bank a
clear window into the borrower’s financial performance.56 And in the case of
default, this arrangement enables the bank to enforce its loan against the
borrower’s cash.
Covenants are not costless. While they protect lenders, they may also
impede value-enhancing strategies of the borrower, since lenders’ primary
concern will be borrowers’ ability to repay, not their value maximization.
Renegotiation following covenant violations is also common. Though routine,
renegotiation may be costly. Technical violations do not typically signal
financial distress. Instead, the lender uses the covenant violation as an
opportunity to reevaluate the borrower’s operational and financial condition
and reset the breached covenant.57 In addition, when violations do signal
financial distress, the exercise of lender remedies may sacrifice going-concern
value.
2. Credit Market Conditions
As one would expect, loan pricing and contracting practices vary with
market conditions. Because lender-protective features like covenants curb the
latitude of borrower management, borrowers tend to resist these constraints.

54.
Raghuram Rajan & Andrew Winton, Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor,
50 J. FIN. 1113, 1134 (1995) (“Effective use of covenants forces the lender to do some monitoring . . . .
.”).
55.
For example, a lender may be required to notify the bank if any of the following occur:
default or potential default on a material loan provision, the threat or commencement of material
litigation against the borrower, or receipt of a notice from a government agency of a material regulatory
violation.
56. See Fisher Black, Bank Funds Management in an Efficient Market, 2 J. FIN. ECON. 323,
326 (1975) (explaining the informational advantages for a lender from maintaining its borrower’s
deposit account); Arnoud W. A. Boot, Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?,, 9 J. FIN.
INTERMEDIATION 7, 11 (2000); Eugene F. Fama, What’s Different About Banks?, 15 J. MONETARY
ECON. 29, 36-38 (1985).
57.
Roberts & Sufi, supra note 48, at 160.
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When credit is plentiful and lenders must compete to make loans, borrowers
enjoy more bargaining power to minimize constraints. The opposite is true
when credit is scarce. Empirical studies confirm that when credit is scarce, not
only does pricing increase, but loan contracts include more lender-protective
features.58 Covenants become more numerous and more restrictive as the riskfree rate of interest increases.59 A similar association exists with respect to
collateral requirements.60
Albert Choi and George Triantis offer a nuanced explanation of the
interaction between price and non-price terms. While lender-friendly changes
in credit markets move both price and non-price terms in lenders’ favor, Choi
and Triantis show that bargaining power does not affect price and non-price
terms independently. Instead, in an environment of information asymmetry,
price changes not only affect the division of gains from trade; they also affect
the severity of adverse selection and moral hazard problems, which in turn
affect covenant structure. Price increases exacerbate both moral hazard and
adverse selection, attracting more high-risk borrowers seeking to pool with
low-risk borrowers, and more strongly encouraging post-borrowing asset
substitution. To be effective for screening and signaling and combating moral
hazard, covenants need to be more stringent as pricing increases. 61
Adverse selection and moral hazard are likely to be much less severe in
the DIP loan context than in the context of garden-variety commercial loans.
Because the prototypical DIP lender is the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy secured
lender, that lender is already familiar with the debtor’s management,
operations, and financial condition. Having already invested in the debtor, the
inside lender’s screening activity is quite focused. It evaluates the debtor’s
prospects for rehabilitation to determine whether to make a follow-on
investment to improve its total return from its loans to the debtor. Moral hazard
is also likely to be much less severe in bankruptcy, given the debtor’s required
public-disclosure obligations in bankruptcy and the careful monitoring by the
DIP lender, other creditors, and the court. While we expect greater information
asymmetry with outside DIP lenders, the infinitesimally low default rate for
DIP loans suggests that even outside DIP lenders do well at picking good risks
and curbing debtor-in-possession moral hazard.62

58.
Bradley & Roberts, supra note 49, at 21 (“[M]acroeconomic factors also play a role in the
determination of the covenant structure of corporate bonds. The greater the credit spread, the greater the
number of covenants . . . .”).
59.
Matthew T. Billett et al., Growth Opportunities and the Choice of Leverage, Debt
Maturity, and Covenants, 62 J. FIN. 697, 708 (2007); Nini et al., supra note 49, at 408.
60.
Arnoud W. A. Boot et al., Secured Lending and Default Risk: Equilibrium Analysis,
Policy Implications and Empirical Results, 101 ECON. J. 458, 471 (1991).
61.
Albert Choi & George Triantis, Market Conditions and Contract Design: Variations in
Debt Contracting, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 51, 70 (2013).
62. See infra note 105 and accompanying text (highlighting low historical default rates for
DIP lenders).
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Of course, information will not be perfect even in the DIP context. DIP
lenders use covenants as tripwires the same way that lenders do outside of
bankruptcy: DIP loan covenants are occasionally breached and then
renegotiated just as with non-bankruptcy loans.63 To the extent information
asymmetry exists in DIP lending, we would expect that the phenomenon Choi
and Triantis posit for credit market conditions and loan terms outside of
bankruptcy would hold for DIP loans as well. Price changes should beget
corresponding changes in covenants and other non-price DIP loan terms,
though with less information asymmetry in DIP lending, we would expect the
magnitude of such changes to be less severe than in non-bankruptcy lending
markets.64
II. Extraordinary Lending Inducements
Customary lending inducements available in bankruptcy help to overcome
the debt overhang that precludes fresh financing outside of bankruptcy. Section
364 of the Code expressly enumerates and authorizes such conventional
inducements as payment priority and new liens, which may even enjoy
seniority over existing pre-bankruptcy liens.65 In addition to these expressly
authorized inducements, market participants have introduced so-called
“extraordinary” provisions also meant to induce lending. Although not
explicitly authorized under the Code, a recent study found, consistent with my
findings below,66 that the “vast majority” of DIP agreements include these
types of provisions.67 The provisions are controversial because they may be
inconsistent with specific Code provisions. In addition, they are often thought
to increase the DIP lender’s control at the expense of other stakeholders.
63. See, e.g., supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing mid-stream covenant
modifications in the Lyondell case).
64.
In Choi and Triantis’s model, in the absence of information asymmetry, covenants and
other non-price terms would not change in the face of credit market changes. Instead, only the pricing
would change. Choi & Triantis, supra note 61, at 66.
65.
11 U.S.C. § 364 (2018). Inducements range from (a) an offer of basic administrative
priority, which entitles a creditor to be paid ahead of general unsecured claims along with other
administrative expenses, to (b) a higher priority that places the new debt ahead of all administrative
expenses, to (c) collateral of various priorities—liens on free assets, junior liens on assets with existing
liens, or even “priming” liens that are senior to any pre-existing liens. To protect the preexisting security
interests that are burdened with equal or priming liens, Section 364 requires that the debtor give
“adequate protection” to those secured creditors. Id. § 364(d)(1)(B). Adequate protection intends to
preserve the secured creditors’ pre-bankruptcy position with respect to their collateral. For example, if a
primed secured creditor was fully secured on the petition date but would be undersecured as a result of
the priming, the debtor could grant the primed secured creditor additional liens to ensure that the
secured creditor maintained its fully secured position. In any event, the DIP loan is required to be paid
off in cash as a condition to confirming the plan of reorganization. Id. § 1129(a)(9)(A). By contrast,
other claims may be satisfied with promises of future payment.
66. See infra Section III.A.3.
67.
LOAN SYNDICATIONS & TRADING ASS’N, THE TROUBLE WITH UNNEEDED BANKRUPTCY
REFORM: THE LSTA’S RESPONSE TO THE ABI CHAPTER 11 COMMISSION REPORT 23 (2015) [hereinafter
LSTA REPORT].
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As noted above, Section 364 suggests a general constraint on the use of
inducements: the debtor may extend only as much inducement as is necessary
to obtain the desired DIP financing. The debtor must show that no lesser
inducements would suffice—at least in theory. This approach recognizes that
inducements are not costless; they can take value away from junior claimants.
This Part begins by describing roll-ups and milestones, two of the most
common extraordinary DIP loan provisions, and explaining how DIP lenders
use these devices to advantage themselves in bankruptcy. I then summarize the
policy responses by the courts and bankruptcy professionals to the use of these
extraordinary provisions.
A. Roll-Ups
A roll-up is a strong inducement for the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy secured
lender to fund a DIP loan. The roll-up grants this inside DIP lender an enviable
position by requiring that the debtor draw on the DIP loan to pay off some—
most typically all—of the inside lender’s pre-bankruptcy secured claim, 68
typically early on in the case. This essentially refinances the pre-bankruptcy
debt with DIP debt, which offers the DIP lender a number of potential
advantages—with respect to both the treatment of its pre-bankruptcy claim and
its influence over the case—that other creditors do not enjoy.
1. Cross-Collateralization’s Ghost
Roll-ups are the progeny of an earlier, somewhat controversial DIP
financing practice called cross-collateralization. In its common form, the
debtor’s major secured pre-bankruptcy lender would be undersecured, but
would be willing to extend the DIP loan as long as the debtor granted
postpetition liens to secure not only the DIP loan but also the unsecured portion
of the DIP lender’s pre-bankruptcy debt.69 This maneuver is objectionable
because the amount and nature of creditor claims are generally determined as
of the date of the bankruptcy petition. A claim’s unsecured status as of the
petition date renders that claim unsecured for the entire case; the Code offers
no possibility for an upgrade later on in the case. Collateralizing an unsecured
pre-bankruptcy claim after the bankruptcy filing therefore upsets the
Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme. Secured creditors should be paid before
unsecured creditors, but cross-collateralization gives a priority jump to the DIP

68.
Seventy-eight percent of the roll-ups in the sample roll up all of the DIP lender’s prebankruptcy claim. These 100% roll-ups comprise 41% of the DIP loans in the sample. Three quarters of
the roll-ups involve defensive DIP loans.
69. See, e.g., Otte v. Mfrs. Hanover Commercial Corp. (In re Texlon Corp.), 596 F.2d 1092
(2d Cir. 1979).
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lender’s unsecured pre-bankruptcy claim,70 which would otherwise be paid
only a fraction of its face amount at the end of the case.
The practice of cross-collateralization began in the 1970s, in the waning
years of the former Bankruptcy Act.71 As with roll-ups today, the justification
offered was that the prospective DIP lender would not lend otherwise.72 Courts
approving the practice however, did recognize cross-collateralization as a
“disfavored means of financing,”73 to be used only as a last resort. The practice
more or less ended with the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in In re Saybrook
Manufacturing Co. in 1992,74 the first Court of Appeals decision to state
definitively that cross-collateralization is not an authorized method of
postpetition financing. Cross-collateralization is “directly contrary to the
fundamental priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code.”75
2. Roll-Up’s Refinement
Cross-collateralization seems quaint in the context of roll-ups, a clever
refinement offering treatment even better than the earlier practice. In a given
case, roll-up improves the DIP lender’s return on its DIP loan and may
augment the DIP lender’s control over the bankruptcy case. Roll-ups also raise
the systemic concerns described below.
To the extent the pre-bankruptcy debt was undersecured at the time of the
bankruptcy filing, the benefit of a roll-up is clear. While the secured portion of
the debt would typically get paid in full at the end of the case, unsecured prebankruptcy debt typically gets paid only a fraction of its face amount, and
again, only at the end of the case.76 By contrast, a roll-up pays in full both the
secured and unsecured portions of the DIP lender’s undersecured prebankruptcy debt in the early part of the case—better treatment than even prebankruptcy secured claims enjoy, and clearly inconsistent with the Bankruptcy
Code’s priority scheme.77 Cashing out the unsecured pre-bankruptcy debt at
70. See Mark J. Roe & Frederick Tung, Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking
Upends the Creditors’ Bargain, 99 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1250-51 (2013) (describing the priority jump for
undersecured DIP lenders).
71.
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 62-57, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978). The
Second Circuit criticized cross-collateralization in the Texlon decision in 1979. However, the court
made no categorical pronouncement against its use. Texlon, 596 F.2d 1092.
72. In re Vanguard Diversified, Inc., 31 B.R. 364, 366 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983); see In re
Beker Indus., 58 B.R. 725 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Tom McCormick Enters., 26 B.R. 437, 439-40
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983).
73. Vanguard Diversified, 31 B.R. at 366.
74.
963 F.3d 1490 (1992).
75. Id. at 1495.
76.
Undersecured claims are generally bifurcated into the secured portion—which depends on
the value of the collateral securing the claim—and the unsecured portion. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)
(2018).
77. See Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Sun Runner Marine,
Inc.), 945 F.2d 1089, 1094 (9th Cir. 1991) (“While § 364 authorizes the grant of priority or a security
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full face value is the ultimate priority jump, and it of course eliminates any
reorganization risk for that paid-in-full debt.78 Even if the reorganization were
ultimately to fail, that would not affect the earlier payoff of unsecured prebankruptcy debt.
In addition, whether fully or undersecured, pre-bankruptcy debt can
benefit from a roll-up by improving the DIP lender’s control over the case.
Cashing out that pre-bankruptcy debt eliminates potential challenges to the
validity of that debt or its secured status,79 which reduces the debtor’s and
competing creditors’ bargaining power with the DIP lender. Moreover, roll-up
may change the dynamics of plan negotiation by eliminating not only
reorganization risk but also the risk of “cramdown” of the DIP lender’s
prepetition claim. Cramdown allows the debtor to confirm a plan over a
secured lender’s objection by essentially continuing the pre-bankruptcy secured
loan at a rate of interest reflecting the risk of the loan.80 But once the DIP
lender’s pre-bankruptcy loan is rolled up, the cramdown option disappears.
Without the threat of cramdown, the debtor has less leverage against the DIP
lender in negotiating the plan of reorganization. To be sure, DIP lenders may
have other devices in their arsenal besides the roll-up to enhance their influence
over the case.81 But negotiations occur at the margin, so marginal
enhancements matter for all the parties.
By using the DIP loan to cash out the DIP lender’s pre-bankruptcy claim,
not only does that claim get paid early and in full, but the roll-up effectively
transforms the DIP lender’s pre-bankruptcy claim into a fully secured,82 firstinterest in estate assets in order to provide some assurance to post-petition lenders, the assurances so
authorized do not include payment of pre-petition unsecured debt with estate assets. There is no other
applicable provision in the Bankruptcy Code authorizing the debtor to pay certain pre-petition unsecured
claims in full while others remain unpaid. To do so would impermissibly violate the priority scheme of
the Bankruptcy Code.”).
78.
This is true for roll-ups of fully secured debt as well.
79.
Roe & Tung, supra note 70, at 1251-52 (“[I]n a roll-up, the bankruptcy process often does
not examine the old collateral’s adequacy and the older loan’s bona fides carefully.”); George Triantis,
Debtor-in-Possession Financing in Bankruptcy, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE
BANKRUPTCY LAW (Barry Adler ed., forthcoming 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2977686.2019).
80.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (2018).
81.
For example, senior secured lenders are frequent sponsors of restructuring support
agreements. Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Quiet Revolution, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 593, 603 (2017)
(detailing senior lenders’ use of restructuring support agreements to gain control over reorganization
process). Senior lenders also commonly “advise” debtors regarding the appointment of a chief
restructuring officer. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 14. Moreover, it is not uncommon for a DIP
loan agreement to prohibit the debtor from filing a plan not approved by the DIP lender. See, e.g.,
$75,000,000 Debtor-in-Possession Credit, Security & Guaranty Agreement Among TerreStar Networks
Inc., et al. 2 (Oct. 2010) (defining an “Acceptable Plan” as a plan “in form and substance reasonably
acceptable to the Required Lenders”); id. at 14 (including as a “Milestone Requirement” the filing of an
Acceptable Plan by November 5, 2010).
82.
The DIP loan will typically be fully secured, with back-up administrative priority in case
the security later turns out to be insufficient. See Daniel J. Bussell & Kenneth N. Klee, Recalibrating
Consent in Bankruptcy, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 663, 707 n.209 (2009) (“‘Roll-ups’ are arrangements
whereby prepetition secured claims are converted to postpetition secured claims.”); Roe & Tung, supra
note 70, at 1251 (noting that roll-up of pre-bankruptcy loans “effectively convert[s] the DIP lender’s
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priority, high-interest-bearing post-bankruptcy claim. The rolled up debt—now
part of the DIP loan—earns interest at a healthy rate during the course of the
case, along with the new money DIP debt.83 By contrast, in the absence of a
roll-up, the pre-bankruptcy debt would accrue interest only if and to the extent
it was oversecured,84 and generally at a lower rate than the DIP debt. As part of
the DIP loan, the rolled up debt will also get cashed out at the end of the case.85
Figure A1 in the Appendix illustrates. This full cash payment of the DIP
lender’s pre-bankruptcy claim does not come for free, of course. It gets paid by
junior claimants, since fewer assets are available to pay off juniors at the back
of the line for distribution.
In addition to issues of DIP lender control and roll-up costs that may
affect a particular case, roll-ups also create an important systemic problem:
they obfuscate DIP loan costs and pricing. For a DIP loan without a roll-up, of
course, calculating all-in spread is straightforward. And even for a roll-up DIP
loan, one could calculate a no-roll-up-equivalent all-in spread. Just back out the
roll-up amount and solve for the new interest rate (including fees) based only
on the DIP loan’s new money. Easy enough in theory. But as a systemic matter,
when the parties are negotiating terms and looking for comparable cases,
comparisons become difficult when there are too many factors to consider. It
becomes especially difficult from the debtor’s side. The lender is the repeat
player; the debtor is a one-off (typically). Add to that the possibly short fuse for
putting together the DIP loan in the run-up to the Chapter 11 filing, and the
debtor may be overmatched.
Roll-ups are controversial because they are not authorized in the
Bankruptcy Code. Section 364 on DIP financing makes no mention of paying
off pre-bankruptcy debt. Indeed, roll-ups contravene the general notion that
pre-bankruptcy claims must wait until the conclusion of the case for payment,
pursuant to a distribution scheme memorialized in a confirmed plan of
reorganization.

(likely) undersecured pre-bankruptcy loan into a full secured postpetition claim”); James J. White,
Death and Resurrection of Secured Debt, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. 139, 182 (2004) (explaining that rollups allow DIP lenders to convert prepetition secured debt into postpetition secured debt, and that this
process “has become frequent if not commonplace”).
83. See infra notes 103-105 and accompanying text (noting somewhat surprisingly high rates
of interest for DIP loans).
84. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2018).
85.
The debtor is required to pay off the entire DIP loan in full in cash as a condition to the
confirmation of any reorganization plan. Id. § 1129(a)(9)(A). During the depths of the Crisis, some
confirmed plans offered flexibility on this score, allowing the debtor to pay off the DIP loan with
securities of the reorganized debtor instead of cash. See supra note 47 (discussing the Lyondell DIP loan
repayment).
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B. Milestones
DIP lenders use milestones to impose important time constraints on the
debtor’s conduct of the bankruptcy case. These provisions place specific
deadlines on the debtor, typically with respect to the filing or court approval of
its plan of reorganization or disclosure statement. When a major asset sale is in
the offing, the DIP lender often sets milestones with respect to the sale process
as well. Milestones may affect case outcomes because they tend to shorten the
time that the debtor would otherwise have to accomplish particular tasks—
tasks for which the Bankruptcy Code already specifies a timeline and
discretionary judicial management. For example, in the court’s discretion, the
debtor may enjoy the exclusive right to file a plan of reorganization for up to
eighteen months.86 The purpose of this exclusivity provision is to fix the debtor
as the focal party in managing restructuring negotiations and drafting the plan.
A lender-mandated timetable constrains the court’s discretion and diminishes
the debtor’s central role, potentially causing lost value for other claimants
besides the DIP lender.
At the same time, however, milestones may play a useful role in setting
expectations and expediting the reorganization process. In some cases, senior
lenders’ timetable may align with the interests of other stakeholders in getting a
deal done.87 For this reason, milestones may generally be less controversial
than roll-ups.
C. Policy Responses to Extraordinary Provisions
As early as 2002, courts began to express concerns about extraordinary
provisions. Multiple sources have recommended restricting their use. At the
same time, the Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA), a trade
association for syndicated lenders, vigorously defends the use of extraordinary
provisions.
In 2002, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York
issued guidelines: extraordinary provisions (a) require conspicuous disclosure
in DIP motions; and (b) will generally not be approved in an interim order
absent “substantial cause shown, compelling circumstances and reasonable
notice.”88 Extraordinary provisions include roll-ups and any provisions “that
86.
11 U.S.C. § 1121(d)(2)(a) (2018). The Code sets an initial exclusivity period of 120 days.
Id. at § 1121(b). The judge may shorten or lengthen exclusivity for cause. Id. at § 1121(d)(1). A judge
will typically extend exclusivity at the debtor’s request as long as she is convinced that the debtor and
major creditors are making progress toward a negotiated resolution of the case. In the large publiccompany reorganization cases, the debtor typically enjoys exclusivity for the duration of the case (up to
the 18-month limit).
87. See Baird, supra note 81, at 607 (“When senior creditors . . . put the plan on a tight
timetable . . . , their pursuit of their own self-interest may work to everyone’s advantage.”).
88.
SDNY General Order, supra note 11, at 2. The General Order also applies to cash
collateral motions under § 363 of the Code. Id. at 3-4. In particular, the court decreed that (i) a motion
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divest the Court of its power or discretion in a material way” 89 (e.g.,
milestones). Delaware’s Bankruptcy Court, the most popular venue for publiccompany Chapter 11s, adopted a similar local rule.90
As for roll-ups specifically, the Southern District of New York guidelines
direct the court to consider, among other things, the amount of new credit to be
offered and whether the advantages of the proposed financing justify the costs
of cashing out the pre-bankruptcy secured debt, as opposed to satisfying that
debt with new promises of future payment.91 In other words, the court should
weigh the costs of refinancing the pre-bankruptcy debt with high-priority highinterest postpetition financing—which itself must be cashed out at plan
confirmation—against the benefits from the new credit. The ABI also
considered the proliferation of extraordinary provisions in DIP loans in its
comprehensive 2014 report reviewing Chapter 11 practices. 92 Skeptical that
these provisions are necessary to induce DIP financing, the Commission
proposed significant restrictions echoing the approach of the New York and
Delaware bankruptcy courts.93
The ABI report prompted a response from the LSTA: the ABI’s approach
to reform, “while well-intentioned and informed by much hard work and
debate, is misguided.”94 For extraordinary provisions specifically, the LSTA
noted the lack of reliable empirical evidence to support the ABI’s reforms.
Moreover, the LSTA cautioned that the ABI’s proposed restrictions could have
unintended consequences, such as reduced loan volumes. Banning or limiting
roll-ups and milestones could also cause lenders to demand other forms of
compensation, such as higher interest rates. The LSTA also argued that
milestones may improve efficiency by shortening the debtor’s time in
bankruptcy when assets are deteriorating.95

for DIP financing must “disclose prominently” whether the financing includes any of the enumerated
extraordinary provisions; (ii) such provisions must be “disclosed conspicuously” in the motion and any
accompanying order, and (iii) the justification for an extraordinary provision must be separately set
forth. Id. at 4, 6.
89. Id. at 9.
90.
Bankr. D. Del. R. 4001-2.
91.
The guidelines highlight “the loss to the estate of the opportunity to satisfy the prepetition
secured debt otherwise in accordance with applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.” SDNY
General Order, supra note 11, at 8. The Code specifically allows the debtor to pay the present value of
the pre-bankruptcy secured claim with promises of future payment. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)
(2018).
92. See ABI REPORT, supra note 1, at 73.
93.
The Commission recommended that several extraordinary provisions, including roll-ups
and milestones, not be permitted in interim orders. Id. at 80. The Commission recommended final
approval of a roll-up only if the new money from the DIP loan comfortably exceeds the size of the rollup, and the DIP loan at issue is the best available option and is in the best interests of the estate. As for
milestones, the Commission recommended final approval only for milestones that provide the debtor
with at least sixty days to complete the task in question. Id. at 73.
94.
LSTA REPORT, supra note 67, at 9.
95. Id. at 56.
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Given the evidence of the positive effects of DIP loans generally,96 it may
be that roll-ups and milestones are worth the potential costs if indeed, credit
market conditions affect their use. Courts typically justify these inducements
with the recitation that no other financing is in sight, and the extraordinary
terms are necessary to close the deal.97 If credit markets are tight, then any
potential negative side-effects may be insignificant compared to the benefits of
the DIP loan. On the other hand, in the absence of a demonstrable association
between the use of extraordinary provisions and changes in credit availability,
extraordinary provisions seem hard to justify.
III. Empirical Analysis
In this Part, I discuss my empirical findings on the variation in DIP
lending arrangements before, during, and after the Financial Crisis. After
describing the sample and data sources, I explain how each of the four loan
provisions—loan pricing, covenants, roll-ups, and milestones—changed during
the Crisis. As noted above, I expect loan contracting practices to vary with
market conditions.
A. Data and Sample
1. Sample Selection
The sample of cases comes from Lynn LoPucki’s Bankruptcy Research
Database (BRD), which captures all “large” public company bankruptcy filings
since October 1, 1979. A large case for BRD involves at least $100 million in
assets measured in 1980 dollars (about $280 million in current dollars). I
restrict the sample to BRD cases filed in 2004-2012 that involve non-financial
firms and were resolved as of February 7, 2013, giving us 278 cases. Of these,
DIP loans are present in 172 cases (62% of all cases).
I also rely on BRD for many firm, case, and loan characteristics: DIP loan
amounts, case outcomes (i.e., traditional reorganization, prepackaged
bankruptcy, § 363 sale, or other), financial characteristics, and whether the

96. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
97.
For example, the Delaware bankruptcy court permits roll-ups, but only where they are
conspicuously identified in the motion to approve financing and are justified. Bankr. D. Del. R. 40012(a)(i) (requiring that financing motion: (a) note whether extraordinary provisions are included, (b)
identify such extraordinary provisions, and (c) justify such provisions). New York requires a hearing to
approve a roll-up. Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R. 4001-2(e) (requiring notice to those directly affected and hearing
on the motion). In sum, courts permit roll-ups, but are skeptical. See, e.g., Transamerica Commercial
Fin. Co. v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Sun Runner Marine, Inc.), 945 F.2d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he
use of financing to pay a prepetition unsecured debt is to be used only in extreme cases.”); In re
EqualNet Commc’ns Corp., 258 B.R. 368, 370-71 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2000) (denying DIP financing that
utilized a roll-up, but permitting certain prepetition claims to be paid during an automatic stay).
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debtor emerged from bankruptcy. For DIP loan agreements, DIP financing
orders, disclosure statements, and related bankruptcy documents, I rely on
PACER. I hand-collected data on roll-ups, DIP lenders’ pre-bankruptcy claims,
case milestones, financial reporting obligations, covenants, and the other deal
terms described below. Finally, I obtain loan pricing from the Thomson
Reuters’ Dealscan database.
2. Credit Availability
As the primary measure of credit availability, I use the quarterly
percentage change in total credit for non-financial corporations (“Available
Credit”).98 I also use additional measures of changes in credit availability in
unreported robustness tests.99 Results are generally consistent across all
measures. As shown in Figure 1 below, my measure of Available Credit
appears largely consistent with the conventional wisdom about the timing of
the Crisis.100 Available Credit rose steadily from 2004 through mid-2007, when
it peaked. A sharper decline followed, bottoming out in late 2009, after which it
rose gradually through 2012.

98.
Our credit data come from the Bank for International Settlements. For a discussion of the
variable, see Long Series on Total Credit and Domestic Bank Credit to the Private Non-Financial
Sector,
BANK
FOR
INT’L
SETTLEMENTS
(Feb.
25,
2019),
http://www.bis.org/statistics/totcredit/credpriv_doc.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CQE-FZAM].
99.
In addition to quarterly change in total credit for non-financial corporations, I use (1)
quarterly percentage change in credit availability for the non-financial sector; (2) year-over-year
quarterly percentage change for the entire U.S., including households and governments; and (3)
quarterly percentage change in the Credit Suisse High-Yield Bond Fund (CHY). I focus on the change
in credit availability for non-financial corporations because it is the most relevant to our setting, but the
results are generally consistent across the various proxies.
100. The National Bureau of Economic Research determined that the Great Recession in the
United States began toward the end of 2007 and ended in June 2009. US Business Cycle Expansions and
Contractions, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., https://www.nber.org/cycles.html [https://perma.cc/BS8S9RFT].
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This figure shows the quarterly percentage change in total credit for non-financial
corporations (“Available Credit”) for the sample period 2004-12. The data come from the
Bank for International Settlements. The data include all credit to U.S. private and public
non-financial corporations and reflect credit “provided by domestic banks, all other sectors
of the economy and nonresidents.”

3. Descriptive Statistics
Of the 278 Chapter 11 cases in the sample, a disproportionate number
were filed, not surprisingly, in 2009, during the depths of the Great Recession.
As Figure 2 below shows, ninety cases—over 30% of the sample—were filed
in 2009 (left axis). And while 62% of the cases overall had DIP loans, the
2009-10 period had the lowest percentage of DIP loans (51% and 44%,
respectively, on the right axis), consistent with the credit scarcity implied by
the trough we observe in Available Credit in Figure 1.
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The vertical bars in this figure show the number of Chapter 11 cases in each sample year
(left axis). The dotted line captures the percentage of cases with a DIP loan for each sample
year (right axis).

Figure 3 below summarizes the most common DIP loan features in our
sample. Of the 172 DIP loans, 155 contain a covenant requiring regular budget
reconciliations; 151 contain a covenant requiring regular reporting of cash; 99
contain roll-ups; 55 contain a reorganization-related milestone (typically a
deadline relating to the filing or court approval of the disclosure statement or
plan of reorganization); and 26 contain an asset sale-related milestone.101 Table
1 below contains variable definitions.

101. My data are consistent with findings in the finance literature that the presence of a DIP
loan is associated with a higher likelihood of emerging from Chapter 11. Sixty-four percent of all cases
in the sample emerged from bankruptcy. Of emerging cases, 77% of debtors with DIP loans emerged,
while only 43% of debtors without DIP financing emerged. Bankruptcy Research Database codes a
successful emergence as long as at least one operating company continues to exist post-bankruptcy.
LYNN M. LOPUCKI, PROTOCOLS FOR THE UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKRUPTCY RESEARCH DATABASE 21-22
(2016), http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/documentation/Protocols.pdf [https://perma.cc/DBA8-M9X6] (“To
emerge, the firm must continue to exist. . . . A company does not emerge if the company continues to
operate only for the purpose of liquidation.”). These figures are comparable to a study by the LSTA,
which found a 69% reorganization rate among firms with DIP financing and a 52% rate among firms
without. See supra Section II.C.
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The vertical bars in this figure quantify the most common DIP loan features in the sample of
278 Chapter 11 cases.
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Table 1: Variable Definitions
Variable name

Definition

Independent Variable of Interest
Available Credit (%)

Quarterly percentage change in total credit for
non-financial corporations

Dependent Variables: Ordinary DIP Loan Provisions
All-in Spread (AIS)
Budget Reporting
Cash Reporting
Financial Covenants
DIP Loan

All-in spread above LIBOR
Reporting interval for budget compliance (in
days)
Reporting interval for cash (in days)
Total number of financial covenants
Dollar amount of DIP Loan

Dependent Variables: Extraordinary DIP Loan Provisions
Roll-up Dummy

Indicator for whether a DIP loan includes a
roll-up feature
Roll-up
Amount of roll-up
Roll-up/ DIP Loan
Roll-up amount scaled by the dollar amount of
the DIP Loan
Term Roll-up Dummy
Indicator for whether a DIP loan includes a
term roll-up feature
Term Roll-up
Amount of term roll-up
Term Roll-up/Lean DIP Amount of term roll-up/(DIP Loan – any
working capital roll-up amount)
Disclosure Statement
Indicator for whether a DIP loan agreement
includes a disclosure statement milestone
Milestone
Plan Milestone
Indicator for whether a DIP loan agreement
includes a milestone with respect to plan filing
or plan confirmation
Sale Milestone
Indicator for whether a DIP loan agreement
includes a milestone with respect to a going
concern sale
Any Milestone
Indicator for whether a DIP loan agreement
includes one or more of the three types of
milestones
Firm and Case Characteristics
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Variable name

Definition

Assets
Ln (Assets)
Liabilities
Leverage

Total assets before Chapter 11 filing
Log of total assets before Chapter 11 filing
Total liabilities before Chapter 11 filing
(Total liabilities / total assets) before Chapter
11 filing
Indicator that case is a prepackaged Chapter 11
Indicator that substantially all the debtor’s
assets will be sold as a going concern

Prepack
363 Sale

Indicia of Creditor Control
Same Lender
All Pre-Assets

All Post-Assets
Prime Dummy
Budget Reporting
Cash Reporting

680

Indicator that DIP lender is also debtor’s
dominant pre-bankruptcy secured lender
Indicator that Debtor’s dominant prebankruptcy secured lender has liens on all
substantially all debtor assets as of the petition
date
Indicator that DIP loan is secured by
substantially all DIP assets
Indicator that DIP lender enjoys a priming lien
Reporting interval for budget compliance (in
days)
Reporting interval for cash (in days)
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Table 2 below shows summary statistics, describing in careful detail the
contours of DIP financing terms that affect the incidence and size of roll-ups,
as well as the use of case milestones. Of our 172 DIP loans, 58% have roll-ups,
with a mean (median) value of $201 million ($80 million). To offer some sense
of the control that DIP lenders enjoy: 74% are defensive DIP lenders, having
enjoyed the position of the debtor’s dominant pre-bankruptcy secured lender
immediately before the Chapter 11 filing. In addition, 79% of DIP lenders enter
bankruptcy with liens on substantially all the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy assets,
while 96% of DIP lenders enjoy liens on substantially all the debtor’s pre- and
postpetition assets; and 82% of DIP lenders enjoy priming liens in bankruptcy.
Finally, for DIP loans with roll-ups, the mean (median) ratio of Roll-up to DIP
loan is 59% (60%).
I separately describe term roll-ups as well. As more fully explained
below,102 some bankruptcy lawyers and judges view roll-ups of pre-bankruptcy
working capital loans as less objectionable than roll-ups of term loans. To
address this issue, I separately test for the incidence and size of term roll-ups
and roll-ups generally. As Table 2 shows, 23% of our DIP loans include a term
roll-up, with mean (median) value of $208 million ($67.5 million). Turning to
milestones, 47% of DIP loans include at least one milestone. They break down
as follows: 23% include a disclosure statement milestone; 32% include a plan
milestone; and 16% include a sale milestone. As for case and firm
characteristics, 35% of our DIP loan cases are prepackaged bankruptcies, while
26% involve a going concern sale of substantially all the debtor’s assets. Our
mean (median) DIP loan firm has assets of $2.8 billion ($637 million) and
mean (median) liabilities of $2.8 billion ($653 million).

102.

See infra Section III.C.1.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for our 172 Chapter 11 cases that include DIP loans. I
rely on Lynn LoPucki’s Bankruptcy Research Data for many firm, case, and loan
characteristics. I hand-collected roll-up and milestone data and financial reporting and other
covenant data directly from DIP loan agreements, DIP financing orders, disclosure
statements, and related bankruptcy documents drawn from PACER. For loan pricing, I rely
on Thomson Reuter’s Dealscan database.
Variable

mean

std

min

p25

median

p75

max

N

0.73

1.43

-2.00

0

1

2

4

172

All-in-Spread

530.68

260.84

150

350

450

700

1300

96

Budget Reporting

26.86

44.93

7

7

14

30

360

155

Cash Reporting

21.40

33.18

1

7

7

30

360

151

Financial Covenants

1.66

1.35

0

0

2

3

5

172

264.37

727.76

0.70

38.75

85

205

8500

172

0.58

0.50

0

0

1

1

1

172

Roll-up

111.60

407.33

0

0

18.75

91.70

4900

166

Roll-up > 0

201.37

531.57

4

37.8

79.75

188.5

4900

92

Roll-up/ DIP Loan
Roll-up/ DIP Loan >
0
Term Roll-up
Dummy

1.09

1.51

0

0

0.50

1.70

7.33

166

0.59

0.18

0.05

0.47

0.60

0.73

0.99

92

0.23

0.42

0

0

0

0

1

171

Term Roll-up

47.46

269.43

0

0

0

0

3250

171

Term Roll-up > 0
Term Roll-up/Lean
DIP
Term Roll-up/Lean
DIP > 0
Discl Stmt
Milestone

208.11

538.93

3

20.5

67.5

143.7

3250

39

0.19

0.28

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.46

1.00

105

0.52

0.19

0.11

0.41

0.53

0.63

1

39

0.23

0.42

0

0

0

0

1

159

Indep Var of
Interest
Available Credit (%)
Ordinary Loan
Provisions

DIP Loan
Extraordinary
Provisions
Roll-up Dummy
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Variable

mean

std

min

p25

median

p75

max

N

Plan Milestone

0.32

0.47

0

0

0

1

1

159

Sale Milestone

0.16

0.37

0

0

0

0

1

159

Any Milestone

0.47

0.50

0

0

0

1

1

159

2813.98

7767.75

212

396

636.50

1800

80449

172

Ln(Assets)

6.86

1.20

5.36

5.98

6.46

7.50

11.30

172

Liabilities

2803.27

7314.43

137

414.50

652.50

1800

72280

172

Leverage

1.06

0.59

0.25

0.82

0.96

1.18

6.15

172

Prepack

0.35

0.48

0

0

0

1

1

172

Sale

0.26

0.44

0

0

0

1

1

172

Same Lender

0.74

0.44

0

0

1

1

1

167

All Pre-Assets

0.79

0.41

0

1

1

1

1

155

All Post-Assets

0.96

0.20

0

1

1

1

1

169

Prime Dummy

0.82

0.39

0

1

1

1

1

172

Budget Reporting

26.86

44.93

7

7

14

30

360

155

Cash Reporting

21.40

33.18

1

7

7

30

360

151

Firm and Case
Char
Assets

Indicia of Creditor
Control

Table 3 below offers separate summary statistics for the DIP loan cases
with and without roll-ups. The two right-hand columns show p-values for (a) ttests for differences in means and (b) rank-sum tests for differences in medians.
With respect to ordinary loan provisions, pricing and covenants show no
significant differences, except for mean and median size of the DIP loan. The
mean (median) DIP loan amount for roll-up loans is $339 million ($125
million), while for DIP loans without roll-ups, the mean (median) amount is
$163 million ($50 million). It makes sense that DIP loans with roll-ups would
generally be larger than those without. The amount of new money required for
the debtor to be able to operate in Chapter 11 would not depend on whether the
DIP loan includes a roll-up. The roll-up amount is simply added on top of the
new money. With respect to milestones, the sale milestone is significantly more
likely with roll-up DIP loans. As for firm characteristics, firms with DIP loans
without roll-ups show larger median assets and liabilities than firms with rollup DIP loans.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for DIP Loan Firms With/Without Roll-ups
This table presents comparisons of loan, firm, and case characteristics as between cases with
and without roll-ups. The two right-hand columns show p-values for (a) t-tests for
differences in means and (b) rank-sum tests for differences in medians.

mean

median

N

mean

median

N

total

p-value for
differences
in
in
means
medians

0.85

1

99

0.58

0

73

172

0.218

0.200

All-in-Spread

504.23

425

65

586.13

550

31

96

0.151

0.182

Budget Reporting

29.55

14

92

22.92

15

63

155

0.368

0.837

Cash Reporting

19.15

14

91

24.81

7

60

151

0.307

0.266

Financial Covenants

1.79

2

99

1.48

2

73

172

0.139

0.155

339.41

125

99

162.59

50

73

172

0.079*

0.000***

Discl Stmt Milestone

0.25

0

95

0.20

0

64

159

0.472

0.470

Plan Milestone

0.32

0

95

0.33

0

64

159

0.871

0.871

Sale Milestone

0.21

0

95

0.09

0

64

159

0.051*

0.052*

Any Milestone

0.48

0

95

0.44

0

64

159

0.565

0.564

1941.13

585

99

3997.70

821

73

172

0.122

0.021**

Ln(Assets)

6.67

6.37

99

7.12

6.71

73

172

0.015**

0.021**

Liabilities

1992.32

542

99

3903.06

882

73

172

0.123

0.015**

Leverage

1.08

0.92

99

1.03

0.97

73

172

0.56

0.405

Prepack

0.34

0

99

0.37

0

73

172

0.722

0.721

Sale

0.29

0

99

0.22

0

73

172

0.279

0.278

DIP loan with roll-up
Variable

DIP loan without rollup

Indep Var of Interest
Available Credit (%)
Ordinary Loan Provisions

DIP Loan
Extraordinary Provisions
(milestones)

Firm and Case Char
Assets
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B. DIP Loan Terms and the Financial Crisis: Ordinary Provisions
The Financial Crisis’s shock to the credit markets facilitates investigation
of the relation between changes in credit availability and the terms of DIP
financing. In this Section and the next, I provide, to my knowledge, the first
empirical evidence on this relationship. This Section examines two types of
“ordinary” loan provisions: pricing and reporting covenants. The next Section
examines two types of “extraordinary” provisions: roll-ups and milestones.
1. Pricing DIP Loans
To examine how the pricing of DIP loans varies with financial conditions,
I take several approaches. First, to understand generally how DIP loans are
priced, Table 4 below shows the average pricing for all corporate bonds and
DIP loans issued in each of the sample years.103 I measure pricing as the all-in
spread above LIBOR (AIS), which captures interest costs, fees, and other
charges associated with obtaining the loan. The average spread is broken down
for each category of credit rating, where higher ratings indicate rating agency
determinations of lower default risk. Of course, this simple analysis does not
account for firm characteristics, but it gives some context for how DIP loans
are priced. As the table indicates, interest rates on DIP loans are generally
similar to those for “Non-investment grade speculative” or “Highly
speculative” bonds. So DIP loans are priced similarly to junk bonds—albeit
high-quality junk bonds.

103. In order to compare DIP loan pricing with corporate bonds, the DIP spread in Table 4
includes LIBOR. The numbers in Table 4 therefore differ from those in Figure 4 below.
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Table 4: Pricing of DIP Loans versus Corporate Bonds
This table shows the average pricing for all corporate bonds and DIP loans issued in each
sample year. To be able to compare DIP loan and bond pricing, the DIP loan spread includes
LIBOR. As the bold figures show, DIP loans are generally priced like speculative junk
bonds.
2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

DIP Loan Spread (inc. LIBOR)
Median

612.10

703.30

895.00

712.40

908.90

810.40

492.30

483.00

801.30

Mean

680.95

769.47

969.58

797.40

919.23

850.08

554.80

579.00

709.63

Obs.

13

15

6

5

15

31

6

5

3

Average Spread on Corporate Bonds Issued
Prime

362.52

451.10

532.42

514.61

368.41

248.74

203.60

175.00

117.27

High Grade

393.45

438.76

552.78

681.67

341.78

291.15

566.45

177.61

139.13

Upper Medium Grade

412.68

420.15

423.84

510.12

475.72

525.25

401.61

365.57

311.45

Lower Medium Grade

481.13

547.09

563.11

558.11

654.05

665.48

501.50

452.60

401.75

Non-Investment
Grade Speculative

631.27

651.46

641.64

632.88

740.62

851.53

744.93

645.13

557.01

Highly Speculative

779.99

804.68

829.67

777.39

865.69

965.68

915.12

869.69

770.54

Substantial Risks

716.27

886.96

942.38

946.44

954.45

924.38

972.85

970.16

928.04

Extremely Speculative

883.33

828.72

1125.00

706.25

945.00

1129.69

812.83

850.00

1133.33
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This high-quality-junk-bond pricing for DIP loans is perhaps surprising
because DIP loans have much lower historical rates of default than do junk
bonds. To my knowledge, only two DIP loans have ever experienced a
payment default.104 By comparison, corporate bonds with similar pricing have
experienced average annual default rates of 10% or more.105 Of course, default
risk is only one component of loan pricing. Liquidity risk also affects
pricing,106 as does the cost of lender monitoring, and both of these factors are
intuitively more costly for DIP loans than for corporate bonds.107 In addition, as
earlier noted,108 institutional features may preclude competitive pricing for DIP
loans, unlike bond markets.
Next, as shown in Figure 4, I track mean DIP borrowing costs over the
sample period. AIS over LIBOR is reported on the right axis.109 The graph for
Available Credit from Figure 1 is superimposed on the left axis.

104. See Moody’s Comments on Debtor-In-Possession Lending, MOODY’S 4 (Oct. 2008),
https://www.moodys.com/sites/products/defaultresearch/2007300000539803.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B7HC-J7PP] (detailing the DIP loan defaults of Marvel Entertainment Group and
Winstar Communications). One of those DIP loans was ultimately repaid in full. See id. (noting that
Marvel Entertainment Group’s DIP loan “was repaid in full, but not per original payment terms of the
facility.”).
105. See STANDARD & POOR’S, 2014 ANNUAL GLOBAL CORPORATE DEFAULT STUDY AND
RATING TRANSITIONS 9 (2014), https://www.nact.org/resources/2014_SP_Global_Corporate_Default_
Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8SY-BEBW] (noting default rates frequently above ten percent for CCC
rated bonds). For example, the mean DIP pricing in 2006 was comparable to mean pricing for CCC+
rated bonds. The average default rate for these CCC+ rated bonds was 13.33% in 2006. See id.
106. Hui Chen et al., Quantifying Liquidity and Default Risks of Corporate Bonds Over the
Business Cycle, 31 REV. FIN. STUD. 852, 853 (2018) (describing the relationship between liquidity and
pricing); Francis A. Longstaff et al., Corporate Yield Spreads: Default Risk or Liquidity? New Evidence
from the Credit Default Swap Market, 60 J. FIN. 2213, 2246 (2005) (noting studies finding “that
variation in liquidity is a risk that is priced in equity markets”).
107. DIP loans are quite different from the typical corporate bond insofar as the DIP lender
will engage in far more monitoring than bondholders do. The dataset shows, for example, that many DIP
lenders require weekly—or even daily—updates of their borrower’s financial condition. Corporate
bondholders, on the other hand, generally have little interaction with their borrower companies and do
not actively monitor them. Indeed, even as compared to ordinary bank loans, corporate bonds contain
very few financial covenants. Additionally, the DIP lender must not only monitor and understand the
debtor’s business, but must monitor and understand the impact of Chapter 11 on the debtor’s business.
See Mark Shapiro, Supplemental Testimony Before the ABI Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter
11, at 2 (2012), http://commission.abi.org/sites/default/files/statements/30nov2012/M_Shapiro_ABI
_Supplemental_Testimony_May_20_2013_2.docx [https://perma.cc/A64U-JLWC] (noting lenders must
“engage in all analyses that are attendant to a more typical loan to a non-distressed commercial
borrower, but they also must understand the legal and financial framework that encompasses a potential
borrower in a Chapter 11”).
108. See supra Section I.A.
109. AIS in Figure 5 is reported as spread above LIBOR, whereas AIS reported in Table 1
includes LIBOR.
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The dashed line in this figure captures mean DIP loan borrowing costs (AIS over LIBOR)
for each sample year (right axis). The solid line is Available Credit from Figure 1 (left axis).

For most of the sample period, not surprisingly, the costs of DIP
borrowing look to be moving inversely with Available Credit. As Available
Credit rises from the beginning of the sample period through mid-2007, DIP
loan costs correspondingly decrease. Then as Available Credit nosedives from
mid-2007 through 2009, DIP loan costs rise, peaking in 2009 before falling
again as Available Credit recovers in 2010.110 Consistent with this inverse
relationship, the correlation between my liquidity measure and AIS is -0.24
(statistically significant at 5%).
To incorporate case-specific characteristics, I use regression analysis. In
Table 5 below, I provide two models testing the relationship between AIS and
Available Credit. The first model includes only standard controls—firm and
case characteristics—which allows me to keep all 99 observations containing
AIS. The second model adds controls for DIP loan terms, which may also
affect pricing.

110. Although DIP loan costs appear to rise along with Available Credit in 2012, that sample
year includes only 14 DIP cases. The apparent anomaly could be an artifact of the details of specific
cases.
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Table 5: DIP Loan Pricing and Available Credit

Available Credit (%)
Prepack
363 Sale
Ln(Assets)
Leverage

(1)
Ln (AIS)

(2)
Ln (AIS)

-0.147***
(0.0360)
-0.0428
(0.112)
0.160
(0.117)
-0.00511
(0.0392)
-0.0969
(0.0847)

6.308***
(0.320)

-0.121***
(0.0409)
-0.0498
(0.121)
0.137
(0.157)
-0.0162
(0.0497)
-0.115
(0.0847)
0.00248
(0.0327)
0.165
(0.119)
-0.0555
(0.177)
6.360***
(0.427)

Yes
99
0.261

Yes
90
0.292

Fin. Covenants
Any Milestone
Roll-up/DIP Loan
Constant

Industry FE
Observations
R-squared

This table presents ordinary least squares tests for the relationship between DIP loan
pricing—proxied by the natural log of All-in Spread above LIBOR—and Available Credit,
our main independent variable of interest. The Column (1) test controls for the borrower’s
size, leverage, and industry, and whether the bankruptcy was prepackaged or a Section 363
sale. Size is measured as the natural log of total assets, and leverage is measured as total
liabilities divided by total assets. Both are calculated using the most recently available
financial statements filed with the SEC before bankruptcy. Column (2) adds controls for
DIP loan terms—the number of financial covenants, whether any milestone is included, and
the ratio of Roll-up/DIP Loan. Both models use robust standard errors and control for
industry fixed effects using 1-digit SIC codes. Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10%
are represented using ***, **, and *, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses.
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Table 5 shows a statistically and economically significant inverse
relationship between Ln(AIS) and changes in credit availability during the
Crisis. The estimates suggest that, holding all other variables constant, for a 1%
increase in Available Credit, AIS decreases by an estimated 11-14%.111 It
makes sense that a positive change in credit supply generally reduces DIP
borrowing costs and vice versa. Indeed, empirical studies confirm that loan
contracts outside of bankruptcy include higher pricing and more lenderprotective features when credit becomes more scarce.112
In sum, the results indicate that the pricing of DIP loans appears
connected to the ebb and flow of the wider credit markets. Such a finding does
not necessarily mean that DIP loans are fully efficient and perfectly priced, but
it does indicate that market forces affect DIP pricing.
2. Loan Covenants
Next, I analyze the use of reporting covenants during the Financial Crisis.
Reporting covenants require the debtor to provide the lender with specific
information at pre-determined reporting intervals. Such monitoring covenants
have become increasingly common in the last decade or so. Modern
information systems facilitate ever more exacting creditor monitoring of debtor
business activities, such that reporting demands have become both more
extensive and more frequent. Though imposing a budget on the debtor has
always been common, DIP lenders now commonly demand monthly or even
weekly reporting on budget deviations and cash levels.
Consistent with the findings on loan pricing, I find evidence that reporting
covenants became more lender-friendly during the Crisis. 113 In particular,
lenders began requiring updates at more frequent intervals. For example, the
data set shows requirements for daily borrowing base updates only in 2007,
2008, and 2009;114 in other years, the most frequent update required is weekly.
Similarly, the first observations of weekly financial statement reporting appear
during the Crisis; in other years, the most frequent update required is monthly.
111. I exponentiate the coefficients on Available Credit to generate this range.
112. See Boot et al., supra note 60, at 471 (noting the relationship between higher interest
rates—and thus credit scarcity—and collateral requirements in loan documents); Choi & Triantis, supra
note 61, at 61 (“[P]ractitioners attribute changes in the breadth or tightness of covenants and in the
collateral requirements to swings in the relative bargaining or market power caused by changing supply
and demand conditions of credit markets.”); Bradley & Roberts, supra note 49, at 21 (finding that
scarcity in credit markets leads to higher number of covenants in loan agreements).
113. Reporting covenants are very common in DIP loans, so there is relatively slight yearly
variation in the use of such covenants. It is for this reason that I focus on the characteristics (rather than
the presence) of reporting covenants.
114. A borrowing base most typically includes inventory and accounts receivable as the
collateral against which the lender lends. Because the levels and value of inventory and accounts
receivable in a going concern are always changing, and the lender does not want to extend more credit
than its collateral is worth, borrowing base reports are a common feature of inventory-accounts
receivable financing.
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Indeed, when we consider the percentage of total available covenants that are at
the most stringent level,115 the percentage increases from roughly 8% (20042006) to 15% (2007-2009) and then decreases to 10% (2010-2012).116 This
finding is consistent with the literature on covenants outside of bankruptcy,
which has found that covenants become more prevalent and more restrictive as
the rate of interest increases.117
This trend is displayed in Figures 5 and 6 below. The columns (left-hand
scale) show by year the number of DIP loans requiring budget and cash
reporting, the most common covenants in the sample, as well as the range of
their different frequencies. The most common reporting intervals are weekly
and monthly, with weekly being the most stringent. The lower solid portion of
each column represents the number of weekly reporting covenants by year,
while the middle striped portion represents monthly reporting, and the top solid
portion represents all other reporting intervals. For both sets of covenants,
weekly reporting dominates in 2009, at the height of the Financial Crisis, while
monthly reporting is generally more common in 2007 and before. Following
the solid line (right-hand scale) in each figure, we also see a spike in the
percentage of weekly budget and cash reporting around 2009, and generally
less frequent resort to weekly reporting before and after. This pattern roughly
tracks Available Credit.

115. This analysis includes only reporting covenants relating to financial statements, budgets,
borrowing base, and cash—not asset sales. Covenants related to asset sales are omitted because it is
difficult to determine the “strictest” level. The ratio reflects the number of covenants at the strictest level
relative to the total number of DIP loans in the year multiplied by four (i.e., the total number of these
four covenants that could theoretically exist in all DIP loans in that year).
116. Even though I find that the frequency of reporting is sensitive to changes in credit
availability, the data also suggest the use of reporting covenants may have increased during the Crisis
and remained sticky thereafter.
117. Billett et al., supra note 59; Nini et al., supra note 49; Bradley & Roberts, supra note 49.
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This figure captures the incidence of budget-reporting covenants and their required reporting
frequencies by year. The two most common frequencies are weekly and monthly. Columns
(left-hand scale) represent the number of budget-reporting covenants by year. Counts of
weekly budget reporting are represented by the lower solid portion of each column; counts
of monthly budget reporting are represented in the middle striped portion of each column;
all other reporting intervals are represented by the solid upper portion of each column. The
solid line (right-hand scale) represents by year the percentage of budget-reporting covenants
that require weekly reporting, the most stringent reporting interval.
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This figure captures the incidence of cash-reporting covenants and their required reporting
frequencies by year. The two most common frequencies are weekly and monthly. Columns
(left-hand scale) represent the number of cash-reporting covenants by year. Counts of
weekly cash reporting are represented by the lower solid portion of each column; counts of
monthly cash reporting are represented in the middle striped portion of each column; all
other reporting intervals are represented by the solid upper portion of each column. The
solid line (right-hand scale) represents by year the percentage of cash-reporting covenants
that require weekly reporting, the most stringent reporting interval.

To analyze this pattern in more detail, Table 6 presents a regression
analysis of the relationship between cash reporting frequency and Available
Credit. The cash reporting covenant is coded according to its reporting interval
in days (e.g., a weekly reporting requirement is coded as 7 and a biweekly
requirement as 14), and each value enters the regression in log form.118 As in
Table 5, Column 1 controls for firm and case characteristics, and Column 2
adds controls for DIP loan terms. The variable of interest in both models is
Available Credit.

118. I take the natural log of the dependent variable to address concerns that the results might
be driven by outliers. Although most covenants require reporting at intervals that range from 7 to 30
days, a few DIP loans include covenants that require only annual reporting. Without taking the log value
of the dependent variable, these extreme observations could skew the results. I also note that, in some
cases, it is difficult to convert the descriptive data into numeric values that can be input into a
regression. For example, it is unclear how one would code a reporting covenant that requires reporting
“upon request” or “as needed.” In these cases, I drop the observation.

693

07. TUNG ARTICLE. DRAFT 3 MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

6/1/2020 6:23 AM

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 37:651, 2020

Table 6: Cash-Reporting Frequency and Available Credit

Available Credit (%)
Prepack
363 Sale
Ln (Assets)
Leverage

(1)
Ln (Cash
Reporting)

(2)
Ln (Cash
Reporting)

0.105**
(0.0521)
0.0877
(0.184)
-0.00112
(0.181)
0.0318
(0.0869)
-0.0483
(0.112)

2.428***
(0.658)

0.0833
(0.0570)
0.102
(0.194)
0.0842
(0.211)
0.0730
(0.102)
0.132
(0.173)
-0.0387
(0.0798)
-0.122
(0.162)
0.253
(0.273)
1.985**
(0.799)

Yes
155
0.090

Yes
145
0.124

Fin. Covenants
Any Milestone
Roll-Up/DIP Loan
Constant

Industry FE
Observations
R-squared

This table presents log-linear regressions testing for associations between the stringency of
cash reporting covenants and Available Credit. The dependent variable is the natural log of
the reporting interval for the cash-reporting covenant, measured in days. Column (1)
controls for case and firm characteristics—whether the case involves a prepackaged
bankruptcy or a Section 363 sale, firm size as measured by the natural log of total assets,
and leverage as measured by total assets divided by total liabilities. As before, assets and
liabilities are drawn from the most recently available financial statements filed with the SEC
before bankruptcy. Column (2) adds controls for DIP loan terms—the number of financial
covenants, whether any milestone is included, and the ratio of Roll-up/DIP Loan. Both
models use robust standard errors and control for industry fixed effects using 1-digit SIC
codes. Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% are represented using ***, **, and *,
respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

As predicted, Table 6 shows that the frequency of cash reporting has a
positive relationship with changes in credit availability, though the Column 2
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coefficient on Available Credit is not statistically significant. Cash reporting
requirements are less demanding—reporting intervals are longer—with
positive changes in credit availability. The Column 1 estimates suggest that,
holding all other variables constant, a 1% increase in Available Credit is
associated with an 11% increase in the cash reporting interval. This finding,
consistent with the earlier finding on DIP loan pricing, provides further
evidence that ordinary loan provisions are related to economic conditions.
C. DIP Loan Terms and the Financial Crisis: Extraordinary Provisions
Here, I study Judge Gerber’s articulated hope in Lyondell that
extraordinary provisions in DIP loan arrangements, such as roll-ups and
milestones, would become less common as credit markets recovered after the
Financial Crisis.
1. Incidence of Roll-Ups
My investigation of roll-ups and Available Credit proceeds in two parts. I
first focus on roll-ups generally, taking account of all roll-ups in DIP loans. I
then investigate roll-ups from a slightly different perspective. This second
approach ignores roll-ups of pre-bankruptcy working-capital loans, and instead
focuses only on roll-ups of pre-bankruptcy term loans and other non-workingcapital loans.119 It has been suggested that for reasons of practicality and
convenience, courts and practitioners may implicitly view roll-ups of prebankruptcy working-capital loans as less objectionable than roll-ups of other
types of pre-bankruptcy debt (e.g., term loans).120 Given this possibility, it

119. With a term loan, the borrower borrows a set amount at the inception of the loan and
typically makes periodic interest payments on that outstanding amount until it repays or refinances the
total amount borrowed. With a working-capital loan, by contrast, the borrower enjoys the flexibility to
borrow and repay repeatedly as needed, such that the amount owed fluctuates over time. The workingcapital loan is typically collateralized with the borrower’s accounts receivable and/or inventory (i.e., the
“working” capital), and the total debt outstanding at any given time is constrained based on the value of
the collateral. For convenience, I refer to non-working-capital loans collectively as “term loans.”
120. Because working-capital lines typically rely on accounts receivable and/or inventory for
collateral, it may make sense to allow this pre-bankruptcy collateral to turn over as part of the debtor’s
ordinary course postpetition operations, with the proceeds of this prepetition collateral paying off the
pre-bankruptcy working-capital debt. Otherwise, the pre-bankruptcy working capital collateral would
have to be segregated from postpetition working capital for the duration of the case. This approach
would create recordkeeping headaches for the debtor; it also precludes the pre-bankruptcy working
capital from actually “working.” By contrast, using the DIP loan to refinance the pre-bankruptcy
working-capital line from the start relieves the debtor from having to distinguish prepetition from
postpetition collateral or proceeds. Thanks to Douglas Baird and Rich Levin for pointing me to this
issue. Of course, this administrative convenience does not diminish the potential harm to junior creditors
from roll-ups generally. For example, as earlier noted, a creditor whose pre-bankruptcy claim is rolled
up has effectively eliminated its reorganization risk. See supra note 80. And a secured creditor that is
undersecured at the time of the filing could still advantage itself with a working capital roll-up to render
the creditor fully secured before the end of the case. See supra Section II.A.
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makes sense to investigate term loan roll-ups separately from roll-ups that
include pre-bankruptcy working capital loans.
To start, we consider all roll-ups. Figure 7 differentiates the DIP loans in
my sample based on whether the loan includes a roll-up. The height of each bar
represents the number of DIP loan cases in a given year (left axis). The lower
dark region of each bar captures the number of cases with roll-ups; the upper
lighter region of each bar captures the number of cases without roll-ups. The
curve above shows the percentage of DIP cases in each year that included a
roll-up (right axis). Overall, 99 of the DIP cases (58%) have a roll-up.

This figure shows the use of roll-ups by year. The height of each column represents the
number of DIP loans in a given year (left-hand scale). The lower dark part of each column
shows the number of DIP loans that include a roll-up, while the upper lighter region of each
bar captures the number of DIP loan cases without a roll-up. The curved line (right-hand
scale) shows the percentage of DIP loans that include a roll-up.

Based on the descriptive evidence in Figure 7, there does not seem to be a
significant relationship between roll-ups and Available Credit. Although the
volume of DIP loans and roll-ups increased during the Crisis, there is no
obvious change in the percentage of DIP loans that include roll-ups. The
percentage of roll-ups is at its lowest in 2009, the pivotal Crisis year, and the
percentage climbs post-Crisis. This is puzzling. Because judges often cite
tightened credit availability when approving roll-ups, we would expect a
negative relation between the incidence of roll-ups and Available Credit.
For more formal tests, I rely on two sets of roll-up measures as dependent
variables, presented in Table 7 below. The first set applies to roll-ups generally.
It includes a dummy variable indicating whether or not a DIP loan includes a
roll-up, and two measures that capture the size of roll-ups: (a) the log of the
raw dollar amount of the roll-up; and (b) the log odds ratio of the roll-up
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amount scaled by the total amount of the DIP loan. The proportion of the DIP
loan constituting roll-ups is a factor that bankruptcy judges care about when
deciding whether or not to approve a DIP loan. The ABI posits that a DIP loan
with a roll-up feature should be approved only when the DIP loan “extends
substantial new credit to the debtor, and provides more financing on better
terms than alternative facilities offered to the debtor.”121 The second set of rollup measures applies to term-loan roll-ups and is analogous to the first. This
second set includes a dummy variable for the presence of a term roll-up, a
proxy for the log of the raw dollar amount of a term roll-up, and a variable,
Log-Odds(Term Roll-up/Lean DIP). This latter variable captures the log-odds
ratio of the term roll-up amount, scaled by what I refer to as the “Lean DIP,”
which is the amount of the DIP loan, minus the amount of any working capital
roll-up. I subtract any working capital roll-up amount from the DIP loan
amount so that in this analysis, we are scaling the term roll-up only by the new
DIP money plus the term roll-up.122

121. ABI REPORT, supra note 1, at 73. I use the log-odds transformation to render the data
suitable for OLS regression.
122. This variable Log-Odds(Term Rollup/Lean DIP) (a) scales the term roll-up amount by
the amount of new money from the DIP loan plus the term roll-up, and then (b) takes the log odds.
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Table 7: Measures of Roll-Ups
Mean

Median

25th
%-ile

75th
%-ile

Roll-Up Dummy

0.58

1.00

0.00

1.00

Ln(Roll-Up)

4.43

4.38

3.63

5.24

Log-Odds(Roll-Up/DIP Loan)

.42

.42

-.11

1.00

Term Roll-Up Dummy

0.23

0.00

0.00

0.00

Ln(Term Roll-Up)

4.17

4.21

3.02

4.97

Log-Odds(Term Roll-Up/
Lean DIP)

0.03

0.14

-0.38

0.44

All Roll-Ups

Term Roll-Ups

This table describes the various roll-up measures I use as the dependent variable to test for
an association between roll-ups and Available Credit. To investigate roll-ups generally, I use
Roll-Up Dummy in a logit model to test for the hypothesized negative association between
extraordinary provisions and Available Credit. I also test for roll-up amounts, conditional on
the amount being greater than zero. I use Ln(Roll-Up), the natural log of the Roll-Up
amount, and Log-Odds(Roll-up/DIP Loan), the log odds ratio of Roll-Up/DIP Loan, as
dependent variables in ordinary least squares regressions. To test term roll-ups, I use
analogous dependent variables. Log-Odds(Term Roll-Up/Lean DIP) is the log odds ratio of
Term Roll-Up, scaled by Lean DIP. Lean DIP is DIP Loan minus the amount of any
working-capital roll-up. I subtract working-capital roll-ups so that in the log-odds analysis,
we are scaling the term roll-up only by (new money + Term Roll-Up).

In Table 8 below, I run a series of tests using the three proxies for all rollups. These models control for the same variables as the DIP loan pricing
regression in Table 5, Column 2, except that here I include separate controls for
the three types of milestones (disclosure statement, plan, and sale milestones),
plus an additional control for the DIP loan amount. As before, robust standard
errors are presented in parentheses. Column 1 is a logit model: the dependent
variable is an indicator that tests whether the presence of a roll-up is negatively
associated with Available Credit, as we would expect given courts’
pronouncements justifying resort to roll-ups when credit is scarce. The
coefficient on Available Credit turns out to be positive and insignificant,
however. It fails to confirm a negative relationship between Available Credit
and the presence of roll-ups.
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Table 8: All Roll-Ups and Available Credit: Regression
(1)
Roll-Up
Dummy
Available Credit (%)
Prepack
363 Sale
Ln(Assets)
Leverage
DIP Loan
Fin. Covenants
Disc. St. Milestone
Plan Milestone
Sale Milestone
Constant

Regression
Industry FE
Observations
R-Squared
Pseudo R2

(2)
Ln(Roll-Up)

(3)
Log-Odds
(Roll-Up/DIP Loan)

0.0484
(0.130)
0.120
(0.448)
0.0138
(0.539)
-0.636**
(0.278)
0.0872
(0.281)
0.00195*
(0.00107)
0.150
(0.166)
0.574
(0.654)
-0.500
(0.565)
1.416**
(0.675)
4.038**
(1.986)

0.136**
(0.0629)
-0.374
(0.276)
-0.0418
(0.232)
0.700***
(0.129)
-3.460***
(1.258)
0.000234**
(0.000105)
0.101
(0.0698)
-0.485**
(0.236)
0.637***
(0.231)
0.0726
(0.235)
2.881*
(1.605)

0.174*
(0.0884)
-0.439
(0.304)
-0.0374
(0.292)
-0.366**
(0.148)
-0.704
(1.872)
0.000170**
(8.47e-05)
-0.0246
(0.0777)
-0.148
(0.435)
0.390
(0.395)
0.144
(0.263)
3.524
(2.393)

Logit
Yes
157

OLS
Yes
88
0.681

OLS
Yes
88
0.265

0.197

This table presents tests using three proxies for roll-ups as the dependent variable, with Available
Credit as our main variable of interest. Column (1) shows a logit model with Roll-Up Dummy as an
indicator variable for the presence of a roll-up. Columns (2) and (3) present OLS regressions using
transformed roll-up data. The dependent variable in Column (2) is Ln(Roll-Up), the natural log of the
roll-up amount, while the dependent variable in Column (3) is the log of the ratio of Roll-Up/DIP loan.
The models control for the same variables as the DIP Loan pricing regression in Table 5, Column (2),
except that I include separate controls for the three types of milestones (disclosure statement, plan, and
sale milestones, plus an additional control for the DIP loan amount (DIP Loan). All models use robust
standard errors and control for industry fixed effects using 1-digit SIC codes. Statistical significance of
1%, 5%, and 10% are represented using ***, **, and *, respectively. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses.
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Columns 2 and 3 offer more granular tests using OLS regressions. These
models test for an inverse relation between roll-up amounts and Available
Credit, conditional on the roll-up amount being greater than zero. In Column 2,
we find that the coefficient on Available Credit is statistically significant, but in
the opposite direction from what we would expect: this test shows a positive
association between Available Credit and roll-up size. Finally, in Column 3 our
dependent variable is the log odds ratio of (Roll-Up/DIP Loan). This measure
captures judges’ preference that the roll-up amount not be too large relative to
the new credit extended by the DIP loan.123 The coefficient on our dependent
variable is again positive and significant. The economic effect of these results
is also notable. The Column 2 estimate suggests that holding all other variables
constant, a 1% increase in Available Credit is associated with a 14.6% increase
in roll-up size. The tests in Table 8 show no evidence of a negative relationship
between Available Credit and roll-ups. Far from it. These tests suggest instead
that roll-up size increases with Available Credit.
I run a similar analysis in Table 9 below, focusing only on term roll-ups.
In Column 1, the logit model tests whether the presence of a term roll-up is
associated with Available Credit. We again observe a statistically significant
coefficient on the dependent dummy variable in the opposite direction of what
we would expect. Here the coefficient on Available Credit suggests a positive
association between the incidence of term roll-ups and Available Credit.
Testing for the size of term roll-ups in Columns 2 and 3 using OLS regressions,
we see negative but statistically insignificant coefficients on Available Credit,
as well as very large standard errors that preclude us from drawing any
conclusions from these tests.

123.
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Table 9: Term Roll-Ups and Available Credit: Regression

Term Roll-Up
Dummy

(2)
Log
(Term Roll-Up
Amount)

(3)
Log-Odds
(Term Roll-Up/
Lean DIP)

0.337**
(0.167)
0.432
(0.600)
0.0540
(0.688)
-0.249
(0.283)
-0.609
(1.041)
0.00108
(0.000764)
0.195
(0.165)
0.250
(0.753)
-0.0905
(0.622)
0.0297
(0.685)
0.325
(2.279)

-0.0855
(0.117)
-0.371
(0.466)
-0.798*
(0.421)
0.694***
(0.217)
-4.549**
(2.040)
0.000201*
(0.000109)
0.0662
(0.132)
-0.583
(0.419)
-0.148
(0.446)
-0.00992
(0.485)
4.626
(2.709)

-0.00425
(0.186)
-0.411
(0.621)
-0.637*
(0.360)
-0.154
(0.266)
0.818
(2.205)
3.48e-05
(0.000139)
-0.00517
(0.153)
0.242
(0.628)
-0.629
(0.639)
0.295
(0.579)
0.475
(3.125)

Logit
Yes
156

OLS
Yes
37
0.859

OLS
Yes
37
0.291

(1)

Available Credit (%)
Prepack
363 Sale
Ln(Assets)
Leverage
DIP Loan Amount
Fin. Covenants
Disc. St. Milestone
Plan Milestone
Sale Milestone
Constant

Regression
Industry FE
Observations
R-Squared
Pseudo R2

0.116

This table presents tests using three proxies for term roll-ups as the dependent variable, with Available Credit as
our main variable of interest. Column (1) shows a logit regression with Term Roll-Up Dummy as an indicator
variable for the presence of a roll-up. Columns (2) and (3) present OLS regressions using transformed roll-up data.
The dependent variable in Column (2) is Ln(Term Roll-Up), the natural log of the term roll-up amount, while the
dependent variable in Column (3) is the log of the ratio of Term Roll-Up/Lean DIP. The models control for the
same variables as the DIP Loan pricing regression in Table 5, Column (2), except that I include separate controls
for the three types of milestones (disclosure statement, plan, and sale milestones, plus an additional control for the
DIP loan amount (DIP Loan). All models use robust standard errors and control for industry fixed effects using 1digit SIC codes. Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% are represented using ***, **, and *, respectively.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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I perform a number of robustness checks for the roll-up analyses. In
unreported tests, in addition to using multiple proxies for changes in credit
availability,124 I use a slew of additional roll-up measures and control variables,
as well as year and court fixed effects.125 I also check for outliers and run tests
dropping successive years from the sample in case a particular year may have
outsized influence on the results.126 The results remain qualitatively similar. In
no event do I find evidence of a statistically significant inverse relationship
between Available Credit and any roll-up measure, and as earlier noted, I do
find statistically significant evidence of a positive relationship.
2. Incidence of Milestones
Roll-ups are of course only one type of extraordinary provision.
Milestones also play an important role in DIP lending, and I examine their
usage below. As with my prediction on the use of roll-ups, I expect the use of
milestones to decrease as credit markets improve. Overall, 34% of the DIP
cases include a reorganization milestone. Recall that reorganization milestones
are covenants that place deadlines on specific important events associated with
the reorganization process, typically the filing or court approval of the
disclosure statement or plan of reorganization. Far fewer of the DIP cases—
only 16%—include a sale milestone. Sale milestones are typically used when,
instead of attempting an internal reorganization, the DIP lender and the debtor
agree that the debtor will sell the business.
Descriptive statistics do not show an obvious relationship between
Available Credit and the use of milestones. In Figure 8 below, the lower dark
region of each bar captures the number of cases with at least one milestone; the
upper lighter region of each bar captures the number of cases without
milestones. The curve above shows the percentage of DIP cases in each year
that include at least one milestone (right axis). As discussed before, the Crisis
began in late 2007 and lasted until mid-2009.127 Yet the years 2007 and 2011
had the greatest incidence of milestones, defined as the percentage of DIP loans
including a milestone.

124. See supra note 99 (describing alternative proxies for changes in credit availability).
125. For court fixed effects, I run tests distinguishing the bankruptcy courts in Delaware and
the Southern District of New York from other courts and from each other. Tests without industry fixed
effects also generate results qualitatively similar to our main results.
126. Recall that over 30% of the sample cases were filed in 2009. See supra Section III.A.3.
127. See supra note 100.
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This figure shows the use of milestones by year. The height of each column represents the
number of DIP loans in a given year for which milestone data are available (left-hand scale).
The lower dark part of each column shows the number of DIP loans that include at least one
milestone, while the upper lighter region of each bar captures the number of DIP loan cases
without a milestone. The curved line (right-hand scale) shows by year the percentage of DIP
loans that include a milestone.

Although I conduct more detailed empirical analysis on the relationship
between these milestones and Available Credit, I am unable to identify a
significant relationship. Table 10 reflects the correlations among use of
milestones and changes in credit availability. None of the correlations between
Availability Credit and any milestone are statistically significant, indicating the
lack of a strong relationship between these variables in the sample.
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Table 10: Milestones and Available Credit
Available
Credit
(%)
Available Credit (%)

1

Discl Stmt Milestone

-0.05

Disclosure
Statement
Milestone

Plan
Milestone

Sale
Milestone

Any
Milestone

1

(p<.50)
Plan Milestone
Sale Milestone
Any Milestone

-0.07

0.70***

(p<.36)

(p<.00)

1

0.09

-0.04

-0.09

(p<.28)

(p<.59)

(p<.27)

1

-0.01

0.59***

0.74***

0.47***

(p<0.87)

(p<.00)

(p<.00)

(p<.00)

1

This table shows tests for correlations between Available Credit and the use milestones. The
left-hand column shows the results of interest. Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10%
are represented using ***, **, and *, respectively. P-values are shown in parentheses.

In unreported tests, I also run probit regressions testing the relationship
between milestones and Available Credit. All controls and other specifications
are the same as those used previously. Across all models, I find no evidence of
a significant relation between Available Credit and use of milestones, so I omit
these results for concision.
IV. Implications and Conclusion
DIP financing is crucial for many debtors, but lenders may understandably
be hesitant to lend to firms in severe financial distress. Recognizing this
dilemma, the Bankruptcy Code authorizes debtors to offer sweeteners to DIP
lenders. But some of these sweeteners—here, roll-ups and milestones—are
controversial because they are thought to come at the expense of the firm’s
other stakeholders, and roll-ups are inconsistent with the Code’s distribution
scheme. Nonetheless, the volume of these inducements escalated during recent
years, leading to growing debate over whether DIP lenders were abusing their
power—or whether the terms of DIP loans simply reflected a tighter credit
environment.
In this Article, I use a hand-collected dataset to provide the first empirical
analysis on the relationship between economic conditions and the terms of DIP
loans. As one might expect, the evidence shows that ordinary loan provisions
like pricing and covenants are sensitive to economic conditions. But I also find
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that the kinds of extraordinary loan provisions often justified as necessary to
induce DIP lending—roll-ups and milestones—have no statistically meaningful
relationship with changes in credit availability. 128 With no demonstrable
association between changes in credit market conditions and the incidence of
roll-ups—and to a lesser extent, milestones—the case for their continuing use
seems weak.
As noted above, a roll-up has significant effects for both the structuring of
plan negotiations and the costs of DIP financing. In addition to being inimical
to the Bankruptcy Code’s distribution scheme, roll-up significantly augments
the DIP lender’s influence over the case.129 This augmented DIP lender
influence correspondingly diminishes the negotiating leverage of the debtor
and competing creditors, a result that the drafters of the Code could not
plausibly have contemplated, since only through roll-ups are these multiple
disempowering effects on the debtor and competing creditors realized. The
distortive effects of roll-ups on plan negotiation make cross-collateralization
seem mild. DIP lenders might understandably feel entitled to outsized influence
over the course of a case when credit is scarce. Scarcity may command a
premium. But without evidence that the incidence or size of roll-ups respond to
Available Credit, resort to roll-ups—and the accompanying control that DIP
lenders enjoy—seem hard to justify as a general matter. Offering DIP financing
should not ordinarily entitle the DIP lender to cash out its pre-bankruptcy claim
at the beginning of the case, instead of having to negotiate the claim’s
treatment as do all other pre-bankruptcy creditors.
Besides increased control for the DIP lender, roll-ups increase the debtor’s
financing costs, sometimes dramatically,130 by increasing the size of the DIP
loan by the amount of the roll-up. Moreover, because the roll-up is not new
credit, it contributes nothing to the reorganization effort. Instead, it detracts
from the endeavor. Between the high interest accrued on the roll-up over the
course of the case and the cash required to repay the roll-up at confirmation,
roll-ups turn out to be quite an expensive proposition, which redounds to the
detriment of junior claimants. Roll-ups also obfuscate DIP loan costs. Curbing
or eliminating reliance on roll-ups would facilitate more transparent pricing of
DIP loans across cases. Far better to see new money DIP loan costs
transparently in the all-in spread, without the befogging effect of roll-up.
Courts and debtors might more easily compare DIP loan pricing across cases
when DIP loans do not harbor rolled up debt.
What about milestones? Though milestones may tend to intrude on
judges’ discretion to manage case timetables, milestones may be less distortive
128. As earlier noted, the statistically significant associations between Available Credit and
roll-up measures found in my tests show only positive relations between those variables. See supra
Section III.C.1.
129. See supra Section II.A.2.
130. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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than roll-ups. DIP lenders may set unrealistic deadlines, but at the same time, a
DIP lender would be unlikely to call the DIP loan if the firm is worth saving,
especially a DIP lender with an outstanding prepetition claim. In a word,
milestones seem relatively easy to renegotiate. By the time a milestone looms
large, the parties will have much better information about the firm’s prospects
than at the case’s inception. The parties’ various positions and interests will
also be well understood. Reasonable milestones may even hasten the
reorganization constructively. The judge’s experience can be brought to bear
when approving milestone provisions.
By providing much-needed empirical analysis, I hope to help
policymakers, judges, and other bankruptcy participants better evaluate the DIP
lending process in order to optimize DIP loan structure going forward. I
hesitate to draw too strong empirical conclusions from these data, given the
limited sample size and relatively slight yearly variations.131 At the same time,
my tests do identify significant relationships between both ordinary and
extraordinary provisions and Available Credit, so the data do have power. As
early noted, it may be difficult for individual judges to police extraordinary
provisions one case at a time. The debtor’s survival will in many cases be truly
on the line, such that DIP financing may be crucial. And the inside lender’s
dominant advantage in placing the DIP loan gives it enormous leverage. At the
same time, however, my results suggest that judges should be skeptical of
claims that shrinking credit markets might justify resort to roll-ups.

131. Moreover, bankruptcy cases are notoriously complicated; there could be relevant
unobservable characteristics that I am unable to control for in the models.
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Appendix
DIP Loan: Effect of a Roll-Up
Figure A1 below illustrates. At the time of filing, the company needs, say,
$100 million in cash. The lender already has $50 million outstanding on its
weak (potentially undersecured) pre-bankruptcy loan, so the lender agrees to a
fresh loan of $150 million, advantaged by the super-priority sections of the
Code for DIP loans. The DIP loan agreement requires that the debtor will
immediately draw $50 million of the DIP loan to pay off the weak $50 million
pre-bankruptcy loan. By extinguishing the pre-bankruptcy loan in this way, the
payoff “rolls up” the $50 million amount into the highly prioritized DIP loan,
effectively converting the DIP lender’s pre-bankruptcy loan into a fully secured
postpetition claim that gets cashed out at plan confirmation.
Figure A1
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